SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SUTTER STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES GALLAGEHR AND KEVIN KILEY,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

GAVIN NEWSOM, in his official capacity of Governor of ) California,

Defendant. )
YUBA CITY
)
)
)
)
) Case No. CVCS20-0000912
) )

## COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT HEARING RE: MINUTE ORDER

OCTOBER 21, 2020

Before the HON. SARAH H. HECKMAN

Tamara L. Houston, Certified Shorthand Reporter No. 7244


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## EXHIBITS

PLAINTIFFS':
ADMITTED

Exhibit A Article of May 8, 2020
Governor's Executive Order
Re: Mailing out of ballots 14
Exhibit B California Assembly Bill 86014

Exhibit C California Senate Bill 423

Exhibit D Executive Order N-64-20 of the Governor of California dated May 8, 2020

Exhibit E AB-860 Elections: Vote by Mail ballots

Exhibit $F$ Overview of Governor Newsom's Executive Action since March 4, 202014

Exhibit G Executive Order $N-67-20$ of the Governor of California dated June 3, 202014

Exhibit H Article June 12, 2020, Courtroom Win for Newsom's Vote by Mail Strategy 14

Exhibit I July 14, 2020 Secretary of State memorandum \#20151

Exhibit J California Special Election History 1989 to present

DEFENDANT'S:

Exhibit 1 Complaint
Exhibit 2 Proclamation of State of Emergency March 4, 2020

Exhibit 4 Executive Order N-64-20 of the Governor of California, May 8, 202014

Exhibit 5 Executive Order $N-67-20$ of the Governor of California, June 3, 2020 14

Exhibit 6 California Assembly Bill $860 \quad 14$
Exhibit 7 California Assembly Bill 423
Exhibit 8 Vote Record for California Assembly 860

Exhibit 9 Vote Record for California Senate Bill 423

Exhibit 10 Ex Parte Application for Interim Declaratory Relief and TRO and OSC July 11, 2020

Exhibit 11 Order granting Declaration Relief and TRO and OSC, July 12, 2020

Exhibit 12 Executive Order $W-29-92$ of the Governor of California, May 4, 2020

Exhibit 13 Executive Order $W-69-93$ of the Governor of California, November 1, 1993

Exhibit 14 Executive Order S-17-09 of the Governor of California, August 31, 2009

Exhibit 15 Executive Order $S-19-09$ of the Governor of California, September 1, 2009

Exhibit 16 Executive Order B-43-17 of the Governor of California, October 18, 2017
Continued:

Exhibit 18 Governor's Statement entitled
"Governor Newsom takes final action of 2020 legislative season," issued September 30, 2020

Exhibit 19 Directive issued by the Secretary of State of California entitled
"County Clerk/Recorder of Voters
(CC/ROV Memorandum \#20232) issued October 2, 2020

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 2020

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

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THE COURT: Court will call CV CS2912, Gallagher versus Newsom. The record will reflect that the attorneys -- the parties and the attorneys are here, and $I$ would like for you to formally announce yourselves on the record.

Mr. Gallagher first.
MR. GALLAGHER: James Gallagher, plaintiff.
MR. KILEY: Kevin Kiley, plaintiff.
MR. KELLEHER: Tim Kelleher.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. KILLEEN: John Killeen, Your Honor, and could I ask who Mr. Kelleher is?

MR. KELLEHER: Oh, I'm sorry. I'm
Mr. Gallagher's law partner.
MR. RUSSELL: Jay Russell, Your Honor, for Defendant.

THE COURT: Welcome. Good morning. So today the matter -- this matter has long -- long been ready to be set for the trial, and we're here today on the trial itself but the preliminary rulings on the Plaintiffs' and Defendant's motions in limine that were filed respectively on October 15 th and October $20 t h$
having to do with the admissibility of exhibits -Defense Exhibits Nos. 3 and 17. You have briefed them thoroughly. I have read them. I have researched them and considered them. We've discussed them in the courtroom as well as on the phone yesterday. And unless there's anything to add, I'm prepared to rule on Nos. 3 and 17.

Is that -- that is what $I$ was understanding you asked for yesterday, Mr. Gallagher.

MR. GALLAGHER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GALLAGHER: We don't have anything further to add.

MR. KILLEEN: Nothing further from us, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So as to No. 3, this is the May 6, 2020, letter from Senator Tom Umber to Assemblyman -- and Assemblyman Marc Berman to Governor Gavin Newsom. We were talking about it yesterday, and I felt that even by parties submitting that certainly No. 3 could have been authenticated, maybe even the hearsay objections could have been overruled, but that offer was not taken, and so I received Exhibit 3 exactly as it is with your arguments.

In -- but even if we could get over the
authentication and the hearsay objection, one of the -one of the arguments that the Defense used is in trying to defend the relevance of Exhibit 3 says that, in part, it was to show that there really wasn't a conflict between the legislature and the Governor, but truly that argument has no bearing on the legal analysis. Whether or not the Governor and the legislature are getting along doesn't change the underlying enabling statutes as to the ultimate order, executive order in 67-20.

And that -- that authority is coming, of course, out of the California Emergency Services Act which I'll call ESA. Is that how you all refer to it? Or ESA? ESA or ESA?

MR. KILLEEN: We call it ESA.
THE COURT: Okay. I'll try to call it ESA.
And so since it doesn't speak to the legal
analysis, the Court finds it's irrelevant for that point. It was further being offered to demonstrate its -- and I'm reading from your brief, demonstrate the effect on the Governor, the effect that the letter or the request had on the government -- Governor, and that's in your footnote one on page three of your most recent motion in limine. And we can't know what the Governor's state of mind is, and it would be -- even if we did, it would be irrelevant to the legal authority
because the legal authority does not come from the legislature, it does not come from a letter, it does not come from anything other than the Emergency Services Act and the statutes attended thereto.

So as to relevance, I concluded yesterday, and I told -- I told you yesterday on the phone that sometime -- you know, that I've read this. I can't unring the bell. I've read 3 and I've read 17 -Exhibit 17 as well. You can't really unring the bell, but if we had a jury, $I$ wouldn't allow 3 or 17 to go to the jury because I don't believe that their probative value of -- that actually the -- what $I$ want to say, the prejudicial effect and the confusion that 3 and 17 could cause the jury would far outweigh any probative value that 3 or 17 would have even if there were some moniker of relevance that would have otherwise allowed you to bring them in.

Did I state that in a way that you understood?

MR. KILLEEN: We understand, Your Honor.
MR. GALLAGHER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Any other explanation as
to 3? Exhibit 3?
MR. GALLAGHER: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GALLAGHER: So this is not being admitted is my understanding?

THE COURT: And so the ultimate question is the Plaintiffs' motion to deny 3 is granted and the Defendant's motion to admit 3 was denied.

Now, as to 17, $I$ think that 17 has the same kinds of problems as 3. And I think that although there's a lot of discussion about the appellate court's considering legislative history and notes from the floor and that kind of thing, I don't know -- I couldn't really -- in sorting through your brief, $I$ couldn't really determine whether those were items that the court of Appeal had asked for to supplement the file or whether they were documents that the trial court had found relevant and had admitted for other purposes, and there may be a distinction, but $I$-- as to this case and the facts of this case, I am -- I don't see where they constitute the -- $I$ don't see them in the group of similar types of documents that we normally take judicial notice of. So the public records and of other -- other commonly disseminated documents that are not truly in dispute, and $I$ don't see it as serving in that -- that role and being something that the trial court would normally take given -- give -- take as judicial notice unless the parties all stipulated to it.

And I think there's a distinction.
In terms of -- in terms of your B,
headline -- or headline $B$, alternatively the senate floor analysis is admissible even if it were not subject
to judicial notice, senate floor analysis would be relevant as evidence at a minimum as to its probative value as to the issue of whether or not there is a conflict between the executive order and the subsequent legislation.

I think all of you have analyzed that and you agree that although there is significant duplication between much of the language in the executive order and in 67-20 and SB43, but $I$ think your -- but $I$ think that you both agreed in court previously that there was some language that -- in the executive order that exceeded either of the bills.

Is that not so?
MR. KILLEEN: There were differences between the executive order and the legislation.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. And so even if it was the legislative intent to somehow -- I don't see how the legislative intent changes the authority that's vested in the Governor. So that -- that was a concern that I had as to 17.

The Plaintiffs' misperception of the purpose
of these exhibits and cites several cases for the proposition that the news of legislature and the legislative history as to the meaning of the statute.

I don't think it's the legislative history so much. I think it's really the -- the enabling statutes that $I$ think are at issue. And so I -- the 17 - if there's probative value of 17 , it's lost in me, and if you want another chance to tell me why I'm wrong, I'll certainly hear that, but $I$--

MR. KILLEEN: We were taking two shots at it, Your Honor. I don't think further argument is necessary, and if this means that the court will not be striking down the ESA, then we will be thrilled to accept these rulings.

THE COURT: Okay. I will be addressing the ESA in my tentative ruling that I'll submit in a few days to you, and I'll hear your arguments today, of course. But $I$ will be addressing the ESA, and having done that -- and then Mr. Gallagher, you wanted some limited weight for No. 18. I'm not sure I've seen 18 . But I have the exhibit -- my exhibit book here. But I'll let you -- $I$ can -- sometime during break or something $I$ can look at 18 unless you want me to make a decision on 18 right now.

MR. GALLAGHER: I think that's fine. We did
brief it, and $I$ think we can discuss that exhibit as we go through this trial today.

THE COURT: And I did -- I do have --
MR. GALLAGHER: I didn't object to it. I
mean, if it's part of our stipulation that these are documents that come in, $I$ just think that what is being proposed could be limited and we can deal with all that.

THE COURT: Okay. That was my
understanding, and now that $I$ look at 18 I did see it in another format, so $I$ do recognize it and $I$ have read it.

All right. Are we ready to proceed? Any
other preliminary business before we hear from counsel?
MR. KILLEEN: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GALLAGHER: As far as the exhibits, so we had a joint stipulation that we submitted. So are we just kind of -- are those in evidence? Or do you want us to formally submit them into evidence? What would be the posture for that?

THE COURT: I think -- so that's a good question because I haven't seen them. I don't know what they are. But if you're stipulating that all but 3 and 17 should be moved in, and you're in agreement that they can be moved in, I don't know why they couldn't be moved in now. And if that makes your jobs easier, then that's
fine. Probably makes my job easier.
MR. GALLAGHER: Yeah. I think what we said is if we filed them in evidence we might obviously have disagreements over the weight of the evidence and what the evidence says, obviously, and potentially objections to specific parts within the exhibits, but otherwise that they could be -- that the documents could be admitted.

MR. KILLEEN: That's right, Your Honor. THE COURT: I think that that is a good plan, and I'd be willing to support. And so $I$ will, at the stipulation of the parties -- requested stipulation of both of the parties, Exhibits A through J are moved in, and Exhibits 1 through 19 , save and except 3 and 17 are moved in.
(Whereupon Exhibits A through J and Nos. 1, $2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15$, 16, 18, and 19 are admitted into evidence.) MR. GALLAGHER: And subject to the objections and --

THE COURT: Subject to any objections. Any portions of them that might be stricken for some reason or -- and obviously raise the issue of the weight on 18, and that might be true to many of the exhibits, actually.

MR. KILLEEN: Your Honor, I'd say that my understanding was that the exhibits would be moved in in their entirety except for 3 and 17. If we are going to be raising new objections to the admissibility of portions of the other exhibits, that's contrary to my understanding or stipulation. So we can argue over the weight of the exhibits, but -- and --

THE COURT: You can argue about the weight, you can argue about what they mean.

MR. KILLEEN: Right, but --
THE COURT: And you may disagree.
MR. KILLEEN: Right. But we are not going to be seeing new objections to the admissibility of portions of the exhibits?

THE COURT: I -- I don't know the answer to that, but $I$ would think that if there were a line here or they were to be stricken, that that would be something that could be raised, and $I$ would consider --

MR. GALLAGHER: I think the only thing that I was thinking of was -- and $I--I$ don't think this involves very many of the documents, but to the extent that there is something stated by a third party, there might be a hearsay objection as to something that is stated in that document. But obviously the document itself, we're agreeing to be admitted into evidence.

But to the extent if somebody is proposing that maybe a -- something that is said in that document by a third party -- and obviously things said by the Governor, well, that would be admission of a party opponent or something said by myself or Mr. Kiley, same thing. But to the extent we're trying to bring in third party statements, there might be -- that was the only thing $I$ was thinking of.

MR. KILLEEN: Your Honor, I think maybe on break we can revisit as the terms of our joint statement because my understanding -- in entering that joint statement is that the parties were agreeing that everything except 3 and 17 would be admitted as a whole into evidence, so if there were -- if that's not what we agreed to, we need to figure that out.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GALLAGHER: That is my understanding, so
I mean, I'm fine with that. So, I mean, that they would be admitted into evidence. So I think that is our stipulation.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
We spoke yesterday as well about -- let me get to the document. About the amicus brief.

Those of you who see these more than $I$ do, do you call them amicus or amicus?

MR. GALLAGHER: I say amicus.
MR. KILLEEN: It goes both ways, Your Honor.
MR. GALLAGHER: Tomato, tomatoe.

THE COURT: Potato, potatoe.
So Mr. Sharma filed the amicus -- requested leave to file an application for leave to file an amicus brief, and the brief was attached to his application. As I told you yesterday, I hadn't read it because I wanted to understand your objections, if any, and I wanted to be sure that you had a chance to read it as well.

I read it last night, and $I$ feel that the arguments, for the most part, are somewhat attenuated from the issues that are at bar, and $I$ think that this is a com- -- a serious enough question that is before the court and that $I$ need to focus on what it is you're asking for and that $I$ decline to be distracted by other issues. And ultimately I do think that one of the things that Mr. Sharma is asking for is not totally inconsistent with what the Plaintiffs are asking for. But my thought would be to -- to deny the brief being filed and not strike the application. If and when this case does go to the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal can make a determination as to whether or not that court is interested in knowing more. But $I$ elect not to
strike it at this time because it's really the application, not the brief itself. So that was my thinking.

MR. KILLEEN: So the Court is denying Mr. Sharma's application but not striking the document from the record?

THE COURT: That's my -- that was my plan. Uh-huh. Is that sensible?

MR. KILLEEN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Gallagher?
MR. GALLAGHER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. And Mr.
Sharma, you are welcome to stay.
MR. SHARMA: Thank you.
THE COURT: So -- so when you're ready,

Mr. Gallagher.
MR. GALLAGHER: So Your Honor, just
obviously this is kind of a unique thing. We're not having witnesses. Our posture of thought was that we would -- Mr. Kiley and I would split both of our openings and closing statements and then $I$ guess in the middle where we would normally have witnesses, we would just have -- we would ask for the opportunity to just present what we think that the evidence in these documents shows, so that's how we were planning to
proceed. I just wanted to make sure that would be consistent with what the court expects and --

THE COURT: Any other suggestions,

Mr. Killeen? That's what I would think.
MR. KILLEEN: That's fine, Your Honor. I
think that we've interweaved our evidence into our openings as the primary presentation here, but we don't object to that.

THE COURT: Yes. Okay. I think -- I think we're all in agreement as to how, at least in broad strokes, how this will go today, and $I$ may have some questions of any of you along the way, but mostly $I^{\prime} d$ like to hear from you in terms of your opening, middle, and the ends, and whether -- on how you want to break that up. If you want to, I'll leave it up to you, Mr. Killeen, whether you both want to start with opening statements or if Plaintiff wants to go straight through and sort of having a closing statement after you have rebuttal after you have put on your case. So - -

MR. KILLEEN: We're comfortable with Plaintiffs giving both their opening and their evidence to begin with, if they prefer to. We don't feel strongly either way.

THE COURT: Well, $I$ think it flows nicely that way.

Do you?
MR. KILLEEN: We do. We agree.
THE COURT: Okay. All right.
MR. GALLAGHER: Okay.
THE COURT: Mr. Gallagher.
MR. GALLAGHER: Thank you, Your Honor. This
is an important case, as you have said. This is a case about the most fundamental cornerstone of our system of government, the separation of powers. As we know well, our founders feared the accumulation and centralization of power, and so they created this beautiful system of separate powers with checks and balances. When one branch invades the power of the other, this system is under threat of disruption.

We believe this is a straightforward case. And we have believed that since we filed our initial Complaint. In this case the Governor, Defendant, has invaded the powers of the legislature. As we intend to show today, he did, in fact, legislate. He fundamentally engaged in lawmaking, policy-making activity, altering and amending existing statutory law, which he was not permitted to do under the Constitution or under a plain reading of the California Emergency Services Act.

Though the legislature did ultimately act of
its own accord to legislate in this arena, their powers -- as we have outlined in our brief, their powers were seriously undermined and their authority continues to be undermined because this order continues to govern contrary to their legislative action.

And the legislature acting within its own separate powers, legislative powers, cannot possibly cure or take away or sort of sweep under the rug, as Defendant -- as Defendant asserts, the unlawfulness of his initial action.

In order to restore the system, we need the judicial branch to exercise its fundamental and separate power to interpret the law, to set the clear lines and the boundary lines between the branches and thereby check the Governor. That is why we are here today, and we hope that at the submission and end of our case you will find in favor of the Plaintiffs granting us the declaratory relief and injunctive relief that we have requested in our Complaint. And $I$ will turn it over to my co-plaintiff, Mr. Kiley.

THE COURT: Mr. Kiley.
MR. KILEY: Thank you, Your Honor. And I want to thank the Sutter County Superior Court as well for accommodating the public interest in today's proceedings which $I$ believe are of profound importance
to our state right now, and I want to thank as well everyone who has come to the courthouse and who is tuning in. I think it's something of great value. And we have all three branches of our government represented here in this room, which is appropriate in a separation-of-powers case, in this branch, Your Honor. Of course, the Governor and Mr. Gallagher and I, my co-plaintiff are members of the legislative branch, although these days it's starting to feel like we're full-time lawyers again.

But in our capacity as legislators, you know, we, of course, have our political views, our opinions, which we fight for, which we advocate for, the same as the Governor does, and everyone here in this courtroom and everyone watching has their own political views as well, their own opinions, sharp differences of opinion, especially perhaps on the issue of the day, or as it's turned out, the issue of the year, and that's the response to COVID-19, the decisions made by the Governor, the path moving forward.

But this case is not about any of that. It's not a case about politics; it's a case about law, of course. We're in a courtroom. But it's about something more fundamental as my co-counsel referred to. It's about the separation of powers and it's about the
rule of law. And by the rule of law, we mean the vital principle that written words are binding on those in positions of power and constrain their actions. From this comes the basic feature of a free society. Freedom from the arbitrary dominion and control of another. It's what gives life to the audacious premise that citizens, we the people, are not mere subjects of state power, but members of a community of equals and authors of our political destiny. It's what makes possible the great American experiment of self government which, on a historical time scale after all, is still in its infancy, is still fragile. I believe that these foundational principles, separation of powers, the rule of law, Republican government ought to be unifying, ought to cut through the cacophony and the distension and the vitriol that characterizes our politics now more than ever. So it is my hope that having this public debate, resolving this issue in a public forum, can commit us anew to these principles and will have a salutary effect on the state of politics in society in the California of 2020 .

Because our commitment to these principles doesn't go away when we're in an emergency. The rule of law does not break down during an emergency. That is when it is most important. A well-designed system of
government, like ours, has enough give in the joints to meet the exigencies of a crisis, but also has enough structural integrity not to collapse or to be transformed into something entirely different. And that risk that we will lose touch with our form of government is heightened when an emergency is no longer a transitory event but has now lasted nearly eight months with no end in sight, no even abstract discussion of when the state of emergency might end.

Over time, deviations from the rule of law start to pile up, and as the norms of democracy take one hit after another, at some point it will put more stress on our civic institutions than they can bear. That is what this case is ultimately about.

And we'll be discussing today two sources of law. The first of course, is the California Constitution. And as we have representatives of all three branches, we've all taken an oath to the Constitution which has a specific provision defining the limits of each of our authority. Article 3, section 3, the powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.

And that principle, of course, came directly
from the founding of our country. We started our opening brief in this case with a quote from James Madison, the federalist, who said the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands may justly pronounce the very definition of tyranny. We weren't the only ones who noticed that quote. The Supreme Court of Michigan cited the exact same statement in striking down that state's emergency services law in a case we'll be discussing more later.

Now eerily, the Defendant in this case uses
almost the exact same words as James Madison did to
describe the present state of the U.S. government. Defendant has repeatedly claimed that the Emergency Services Act, the second source of law we'll be discussing today, quote, centralizes the state's powers in the hands of the Governor.

So the Defendant maintains that the California of Emergency Services Act does the very thing that the father of the U.S. Constitution described as the definition of tyranny and that our state Constitution expressly forbids.

Our case today, Your Honor, is simple. It does no such thing. And if it did, it would violate our own state's Constitution. The laws of the state of California do not countenance an autocracy under any
circumstances. They do not allow for one person rule. They do not empower a governor to legislate, not for one day, and certainly not for eight months with no end in sight.

Shortly my co-counsel will be delving into the evidence as to the order at issue in this case. But I would, to begin, like to provide some context as to the circumstances under which that order was issued because the state of emergency that we are under is unprecedented in several ways. In at least three ways. The first, which I've just mentioned, is the duration. The second is the sheer volume of executive orders that have been unilaterally issued. Fifty-seven executive orders changing over 400 dually enacted California laws.

But the third distinguishing unprecedented feature is the kind of power that has been exercised. Both sides agree -- appear to agree that the executive order in question, $N-67-20$, was an exercise of legislative power by the Governor. That has never been contested by the Defendant in any of the briefing.

We disagree as to whether this is allowed by the Emergency Services Act. In Defendant's trial brief, he states that our interpretation, quote, would leave the Emergency Services Act ardently toothless. The

Governor would be sidelined for weeks or months hoping for eventual legislative action while the earthquake, fire, or pandemic is raging.

Toothless, that's how our interpretation is
described. Yet in all of the evidence before the court, the Defendant has not identified a single emergency action by any governor, any prior governor, that is inconsistent with our interpretation. And as the Defendant himself says in this same trial brief, California Governor's have used the Emergency Services Act for 50 years to combat droughts, medfly infestations, wildfires, earthquakes, and now pandemics. Apparently they've all used it in a toothless way because in these 50 years of droughts, medfly infestations, wildfires, earthquakes, Defendant has not identified a single governor who created statutory law in the way that the Governor did in this case. He cannot identify any single action of any past governor that our toothless reading of the act would have prevented.

The only executive orders in the record that would have been enjoined by the relief we seek today are the Defendant's. It's the Defendant who is using the Act in an unprecedented way. It is the Defendant who is acting on a new theory of the powers granted by the Act,
a new and boundless well of authority in the Act that somehow escaped the attention of all prior Governor's that they have referenced as well as the Courts who have adjudicated the case law that's been discussed in the briefing.

And so while the legal theory offered by the defense has shifted, to some extent, throughout the course of this case, ultimately they've landed on a particular provision of the Emergency Services Act which has dozens of sections, but they've sort of characterized section 8627 as some catchall which refers to the police powers. And have described this section as affording the Governor, quote, plenary authority to govern which, of course, would literally give him boundless power that would render the other 100 pages of the act superfluous.

So I'm going to discuss later why that is wrong as a matter of statutory construction, but right now, $I$ just want to underline what a novel theory of the Emergency Services Act this is. It is just as there is nothing in the record of any prior governor using an executive order to legislate, so to there is nothing in the record of any prior governor ever citing this section, 8627, as the basis for any order. It's not in any of the several elections-related orders that the
defense has produced in this case, and it's not in the cases discussed by the Courts. It's not even mentioned. And yet here this section 8627 has been invoked in 24 orders by Governor Newsom during the COVID-19 state of emergency, the one at issue in this case, and at least 23 others. So out of 57 orders that have been issued, 23 of them have cited section 8627 which, again, they have not provided a single example of any other governor citing once. And all of these orders do exactly what the order at issue here does. Exercise legislative powers, unilaterally create policy.

So let me just go over a few examples. My co-counsel will be discussing the order at issue in this case directly in 67-20 in great detail. And these are all, Your Honor, in Exhibit $G$, although it might be more trouble than it's worth to flip through them as I'll just be giving you enough to get a flavor for each one. So N-57-20 deals with debt collection that established that Cares Act's funds were shielded from any debt collectors. N-51-20 deals with paid sick leave. It provides that a hiring entity shall provide COVID-19 supplemental paid sick leave to each sector worker who works -- who performs work for and through the hiring entity and goes through a whole variety of laws and procedures and requirements dealing with that
new program.
N-62-20 deals with worker's compensation. It says that any COVID-19-related illness of an employee shall be presumed to arise out of and in the course of the employment for the purpose of awarding workers' compensation benefits if all of the following requirements are satisfied and goes into great detail about those requirements. $N-66-20$ deals with teacher credentialing. It provides that candidates for credential -- the usual test is suspended so they must complete a different one past commission approved -CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER: Mr. Kiley, would you please slow down just a little bit, please. MR. KILEY: Will do. Thank you. This is our court reporter. Actually I'm putting your fingers through stress, I'm sure.

The final one $I$ wanted to reference was N-44-20 which deals with price gouging which is actually a topic the legislature has legislated on specifically to prepare for emergencies. And this provides that in addition to the prohibition set forth in Penal Code section 396 , a person or other entity shall not sell or offer to sell any item from among a whole list of new goods and categories. There is a whole bunch of other topics addressed.

How is my speed? We good?
There is a whole -- there is a whole host of other topics addressed. Reentry proceedings, marriage licenses, tax exemptions, water shutoffs, foster youth placements.

Now, we're not contesting the wisdom of these policies per se. I'm sure there are some that we would agree with as a matter of policy and some we would disagree with, but the important point is that none of them went through any legislative process. We don't know what opportunity there was for any stakeholder input. We know there wasn't any opportunity for public presentation. We don't know what special interests might have had a seat at the table. None of it was public. There was no deliberation, negotiation, compromise, veto-gates, the things that characterizes the legislative process in these policies expanding in near every California code.

So, Your Honor, this case presents what is truly a question of first impression, and that is whether the Emergency Services Act affords unrestricted police powers, which no governor in the record has ever laid claim to, but which the Defendant here has claimed the basis for 24 different orders effectuating dozens of actions throughout many different wheel codes touching
nearly every facet outwardly lying without any legislative process or consideration of those policies in a public forum.

We will argue that if this newly discovered bottomless well of authority is not, in fact -- is, in fact, a feature of the Emergency Services Act, then the Act cannot stand under our Constitution. And as a matter of fact, it is that interpretation, which Defendant will give it as acting upon, would put it on par with the law that was just struck down by the Michigan State Supreme Court. The Court there citing an earlier Massachusetts case that actually dealt with a - an executive action pertaining to elections, said, quote, that the law would provide a roving commission to repeal or amend by executive order under unspecified provisions -- under executive order unspecified provisions anywhere -- included anywhere in the entire body of state law.

So I want to -- we'll return to that phrase, roving commission, because that's what the Michigan Supreme court found that the emergency powers of the Governor Act there provides, and that is what the Defendant in this case provides -- argues that our Emergency Services Act provides.

So we will argue that these are the two
options that are before the Court today. If California law is as broad as the Defendant argues in this case, affording unrestricted police powers and the plenary authority to govern, then it too must be struck down for the same reason that the Michigan law was. But if, on the other hand, California's law is narrower than Michigan's, as we argue, then the Governor's order in this case and many of his other orders was not authorized by the Emergency Services Act or by any statute and should be struck down for that reason, and the Governor should be enjoined from issuing any further such orders as has become a habit during this state of emergency.

I'd now like to hand it back over to my co-counsel/co-plaintiff who will run through some of the evidence.

MR. GALLAGHER: So, Your Honor, just -would you want them to do their opening at this point, or do you want -- what $I$ was intending to do was go into the evidence, you know, in these exhibits in some detail. I guess sort of as a middle to this. But do you want them to give their opening statements first, or what would be your preference?

MR. KILLEEN: I mean, Your Honor, again, we interviewed their evidence into our opening. It might
be more coherent to hear them back up their opening with their evidence since that's effectively what we will be doing.

THE COURT: I think that's what we were expecting.

MR. GALLAGHER: I just wanted to make sure. THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. GALLAGHER: Well, thank you, Your Honor.
So now let's deal with what's before the Court, what evidence is before the Court, and I think we should begin with the Complaint itself, our Complaint, which is Exhibit 1 in your -- in your binder. And I would point out, what is it that we alleged to you at the outset of this litigation. And I think in -- I would point out some relevant parts from the Complaint and then go into what the evidence shows and how we actually prove -- we approve in those allegations.

So I'll start with Exhibit 1, our Complaint, on page two, paragraph eight, we allege the California State Legislature, though recessing temporarily during the COVID-19 pandemic, had reconvened and has been in session since May 4 th, 2020 .

Paragraph nine, we allege the legislature is
currently considering legislative bills dealing with elections procedures for the November 3rd, 2020, general
election.
Then going to page three, paragraph 13, we allege on June 5th, 2020, Defendant issued executive order $\mathrm{N}-67-20$. Here's the executive order which provides directives related to the conduct of the November 3rd, 2020, general election which directives significantly change the choices voters have with regard to voting and the places and manner of casting votes.

On that same page, paragraph 16, by
exercising legislative actions in the executive order, the Defendant is currently in clear violation of the separation of powers.

Page four, paragraph 18, Plaintiffs therefore seek a declaratory judgment of this Court that the executive order so issued is null and void as it is an unconstitutional exercise of legislative powers reserved only to the legislature, nor is it permitted -is it a permitted action under the statutory framework provided under the California Emergency Services Act, California Government Code 8550 through 8669.7. Then we seek declaratory judgment.

And then in paragraph 21, Plaintiff further seeks to restrain and enjoin the Defendant from, one, carrying out or implementing the provisions of the executive order; and two, from further exercising any
legislative powers in violation of the California Constitution and applicable statute specifically from unilaterally amending, altering, or changing existing statutory law or making new statutory law.

So those, $I$ think, are the relevant points of our Complaint, what we've alleged and what we are asking for.

So with the evidence before us, what do we have? We begin obviously with the order itself, which is Exhibit 5. Defendant's Exhibit 5. In that executive order, $N-67-20$, on page two, halfway down, we see this is the order. It's in evidence. What does it do?

Specifically part one, it is hereby ordered that all Californians who are registered and otherwise eligible to vote in the November 3rd, 2020, general election shall receive vote-by-mail ballots.

By doing so, this changed portions of the Elections Code that currently provide the current statute at that time provided that it was an elective process to get a mail ballot. A voter would have to ask for and apply to get a mail ballot. This order summarily changed that and said you will automatically get a mail ballot consistent with a previous order that the Governor had issued.

Then we move to number two. Notwithstanding
any contrary provision of state law, including, but not limited to, and he calls out the Elections Code sections 3019.5 and 3019.7 , all county elections officials are required to use the secretary of state's vote-by-mail ballot tracking system created pursuant to

Elections Code section 3019.7 and to use intelligent mail bar codes on all vote-by-mail ballot envelopes.

Of course, looking at the code at the time it provided that counties could use their own ballot tracking system if they so desired. And it also -there was no requirement whatsoever in statutory law that a county use intelligent mail bar code on their mail ballot envelopes. So, again, substantively altered Elections Code 3019.5 and 3019.7 .

Section three outlines that contrary to the California Voter's Choice Act that they shall not be required to make available more than one polling place per 10,000 registered voters as long as the county complies with all of the following requirements.

Sorry. Excuse me, Your Honor. Strike that.
So as regard to provision No. 3, this is in
regards to counties that are not Voter Choice Act
counties. It changes Elections Code section 12- - 12200 to 12286 which specifically provides that every - in a traditional elections county, every precinct shall
have a polling place, and says, oh, that's no longer the law, and instead counties you -- as long as you provide one polling place per 10,000 voters and follow the provisions that are stated therein, A, B, and C, that you can essentially operate a different type of voting structure. So, again, substantively alters and changes the relevant Elections Code there, 12200 to 12286 .

And then No. 4 deals with Voter Choice Act counties and says that instead of having the vote centers open for the required ten days under the statute, which would be in section 4005 of the Elections Code, they only need to have them open for three days prior to the election. So, again, substantively changing the requirements of the Voter Choice Act that is found in Elections Code 4005 .

And then No. 5, and another critical one that we brought up in our briefing. Voter Choice Act county pursuant to then Elections Code 4005 - - actually existing -- what was and what is existing Elections Code $4005(\mathrm{a})(10)$, Voter's Choice Act counties are required to have publicly noticed meetings with voting rights groups including those in the disabled communities, those with English language access concerns. They are required by that code section to do so.

The Governor in this order summarily does
away with that publicly noticed meeting and says, instead, county, you can put your information on -- of your plan on a website and for ten days take public comment, and then that will be sufficient to meet your requirements under $4005(\mathrm{a})(10)$. Not consistent with the Elections Code. Completely changes what that says.

So with all that, $I$ think it is very clear that, yes, in fact, the Governor did substantively alter and change, amend the Elections Code. And not in any minor way, but in some very significant ways.

In fact, Defendant in his briefing before this Court has admitted that it does not just suspend the Elections Code, but, in fact, actually changes the Elections Code.

So now to the issue of what was actually going on at the time this order was issued on June 5th, 2020. Was there, in fact, an urgency to provide direction. And the evidence before the court shows that, no, there was not. And I will go through that.

First of all, we know that the legislature was already acting to provide unique procedures for the November election just as we had pointed out, we allege in our Complaint. Well, the evidence shows it. And that's why I move to a different binder. Exhibit B and C, I would draw the Court's attention to. Exhibits B - -

Exhibit $B$ is a true and correct copy of an 860 as it existed on May 28th, 2020, just before the executive order was issued. And if you look at that, it shows that, first of all, this legislation was in very substantial form of what it was ultimately enacted into on May 28th. And then if we look to Exhibit C, we see the same true and correct copy of $S B 423$, which as of May 27 th, 2020 , was in its substantial form of what it was ultimately enacted into, and you can certainly compare that with Defendant's Exhibits 6 and 7 which show the finally enacted legislation.

But if we look at both of those, we see clearly that as of the date that this order was issued, the legislature already had bills in substantial form. And then we go to Exhibit E, which shows the legislative history of both of these bills. And in Exhibit E, we see very clearly that on the first page, an 860 , on May 28th, 2020, was in the -- was in the senate elections committee. So this bill had already moved from the assembly where it originated and had been passed to the opposite house and was being heard in committee as of May 28th, 2020 , before the Governor's executive order.

And the next page, we see the same legislative history for $S B 423$. Again, this is -- this
bill at the time had passed its first house, in this case the senate, and was now on the assembly side. And as of May 27, 2020, was re-referred to the committee on elections and redistricting the assembly committee on election redistricting.

In that same history in Exhibit E, and we can also look to Defendant's Exhibit 6 and 7, the enacted bills, shows that, in fact, both of these bills were passed, an 860 passed and signed on the same day by the Governor, by the way, for an 860 on June 18th, five months prior to the November election, and SB 423 on August 6, three months prior to the November election. So all of this is evidence that the legislative process was working, it was ongoing, and there is nothing that shows that there was the urgency necessitated to do an order that we should somehow not go through the normal legislative process to establish election law.

Other than the Governor's own statements in his executive orders, there is simply no evidence before the Court that this was a necessary action.

And as we have pointed out, there is nothing that the Governor can point to in the Emergency Services Act that would have authorized his action. The Defendant can point to no evidence in the records that
there was some urgency to enact a policy scheme immediately and unilaterally outside of the normal legislative process to deal with the November election. Those are the facts in the evidence before you.

What is also not in evidence -- because I think it's important to point out what is not in evidence. What is not in evidence is any indication from the legislature that it viewed itself as working in tandem with the Governor or that it was ratifying, confirming, or approving his order. It does not exist in the legislation itself, and as we pointed out in our trial brief and in our briefing many times, Exhibits 6 and 7 are the officially enacted bills, legislation, an 860 and $S B 423$, very clear that there is nothing in that legislation that expresses such an intent. And, in fact, both of those bills have for us legislative intent language. Official legislative intent language in the precursor to both bills. None of them, nothing in there mentions working in tandem with the Governor. In fact, they do not mention the executive order at all.

Then you combine this with Exhibit H, which is an article describing the Governor -- the Governor's response to legislation that was being worked on after he had already issued his first elections order, but let's go to that Exhibit H. Where is that exhibit
binder?
So in Exhibit $H$, if we go to the fifth page there, halfway down, wherein it says, "But Newsom has struck a much more confident tone. During a press conference on May 22 nd," and $I$ would point out that we know that the first executive order that established an all-mail-ballot election was, $I$ believe, issued on May the 3rd -- I'm sorry, May the 6th of 2020. On May 22nd, he insisted that his order was on firm legal ground, and though it would be nice to have the legislature pass its own version of the new rules, he argued that it wasn't strictly necessary.

And then he is quoted as saying, "We appreciate their work, and to the extent that they want to codify it, $I$ think that could help out as well." Why not?

That doesn't sound to me like a statement of a planned coordination with the legislature. If there was truly some decision at the outset as the Defendant's contend that this was all in conjunction and coordination, why would he have said here that legislation wasn't strictly necessary?

So what were the Governor's actual motives? Well, I think we have that evidence in the record, Exhibit A, and it has the press release from when he
issued the first executive order. And again, when I refer to the first executive order, Your Honor, I'm talking about $N-64-20$, which I believe is -- I believe that would be in Defendant's Exhibit -- Defendant's Exhibit 4, and it's also in our Exhibit A. Sorry, Exhibit A. And that, again, was issued on the 8 th day of May of 2020.

But looking at our Exhibit $A$, Your Honor, there's -- you know, there is a press release there that was issued in conjunction with that order, and it's very clear from that press release that the Governor wanted to be the first in the nation to call for an all-mail-ballot election. The issue of mail ballots have become a big issue nationally. There have obviously been a lot of partisan -- I think that we could almost take judicial notice of back and forth about mail ballots. And the Governor wanted to be the first in the nation to have an all-mail-ballot election. And he essentially -- this essentially stated as such in that press release. And, of course, going back to Exhibit $H$ in that article, he again stated on May $22 n d$ that his order was on firm legal ground. He believed he had the power of his own accord to issue this order.

It's only after this lawsuit was filed on
June 11th, 2020 -- we're moving through the chronology
here. Most of these statements are in May. It's only after our lawsuit is filed that we begin to see a change in posture. First, we have this allegation of working in tandem. As we've gone through, there is no evidence of that in the record, and -- that the Defendant's can point to. Then we started to hear in the arguments that the order was superseded or ratified by the legislature in their legislation. Again, no evidence of that and $I$ can go -- I can go into some more detail there. The evidence doesn't show that.

So now we have this moot because the election is already ongoing. And so now here we are at this point. It's always been Defendant's intent to wait this out and to hope to avoid a -- a check on his overreach of power. I like to point to Exhibit 10. Our argument has always been the same, Your Honor, and we made it in our first ex parte application for a temporary restraining order that this was a clear violation of the separation of powers. We outlined why the law prohibited this action. And we think that was a key indication of why -- a key part of why a temporary restraining order was initially issued in this case.

But getting to this issue of was the Governor's order superseded because the Governor and the Defendant wants to use Exhibit 18 as evidence of that.

And Exhibit 18, if we turn to that -- Exhibit 18 is what we were discussing a little bit earlier, and I'll get into a little bit more detail on it in the motion in limine, is a sort of statement of the Governor when he's issuing his last signings of bills on September 30 th, 2020. It's the last day for him to sign a bill into law, and he makes a statement here of -- of, you know, the things that he is, you know, signing and, you know, what the importance of those measures. And for the first time on September 30 th he makes this statement that legislation has superseded -- at the bottom of page two here of Exhibit 18 -- legislation has superseded the following executive orders. And he points out that executive order N-64-20 and executive order $N-67-20$ have been superseded by an 860 and 423. On September 30 th, that is the first statement of the Governor that it has been superseded. Of course, a statement alone doesn't mean that it, in fact, has been superseded. That's just a statement, and we would argue it's a very self-serving statement.

But the facts -- we can look to the facts in the record to undermine that contention. And what I'd first say is let's look at Exhibit I and Exhibit 6. Exhibit 6 is, of course, an 860 as it's been fully enacted and signed into law. And if the court wants to
look through the whole thing, but, I mean, I think if you look through the whole thing, you will see very clearly there is no requirement that counties, again, use intelligent mail ballot on their ballot envelopes. That -- that bill, as we know, was enacted on June 18th, 2020 .

Yet on July 14th, 2020, we have Exhibit I, which is the secretary of state telling counties, in the very first paragraph on the first page of Exhibit I, a memo to county elections officials, all county clerks, registrars of voters wherein it states, "Executive order N-67-20 provides that all county elections officials are required to use intelligent mail bar codes on vote-by-mail ballot envelopes." And they are very clear about it. They -- even after 860 is passed on June 18th, the executive branch, the secretary of state, is still requiring and even cites to his authority executive order $N-67-20$. That doesn't sound like an order that's been superseded by legislation. In fact, in that same paragraph you'll note that they actually note that the state legislature passed Assembly Bill 860, and yet they are still requiring that. Again, in fact, we don't see the superseding of the order despite the Governor's statement.

And, of course, the order actually continues
to require intelligent mail ballot -- intelligent mail bar code on envelopes, and we look to Defendant's Exhibit 19 for that fact.

And in Exhibit 19 we, again, have another memo from the secretary of state, this one dated October 2nd, 2020, earlier this month. And if we go to the eighth page of that document, page eight, there is pages on the bottom of that, the eighth page of that -page eight of that document under "tracking counties using ballot tracks are generally required to use intelligent mail bar codes with exceptions as authorized by the secretary of state." So it's, again, being required regardless of the fact that an 860 had already been passed on June 18th, 2020.

Then if we look at SB 423, Exhibit 7, on page three of that exhibit, section 1602 as is described in the legislation makes amendment to section 4005 , the election code that $I$ mentioned earlier. But you will see very clearly it does not amend section $4005(a)(10)$. It only amends that portion of the Elections Code to provide for vote centers to only be open three days before election. It does not do anything with regard to the statutory law that Voter Choice Act counties must have publicly-noticed meetings with voting rights groups. That's what 423 does very clear. It does not
amend that Elections Code. But the order does, as we pointed out in Exhibit 5. "By existing statutory law," and this is important, "the Voter Choice Act counties were required to conduct the notice meetings with voting rights groups." If they did not, it is only because of this order. And again, it is not superseded even now. If we go back to that Exhibit 19, the memo, again, from secretary of state on page three, again, this is October $2 n d$, earlier this month, October 2 nd memo. On page three, they are very clear about it, additionally -- go midway down the page on Exhibit 3, additionally, "VCA counties are not required to conduct any in-person public meetings or workshops in connection with the preparation of plans for the administration of this election as provided for in section 405 (a) (10)" [sic], they even quote the statute that still says you have to. But the secretary of state here is saying no, you don't, on October 2nd. That's clearly still the directive. The order has not been superseded no matter what the Governor might say on September 30th.

And again, that's a statement on
September 30 th that the Governor in Exhibit 18 makes that statement and then we have a memo on October 2 nd still enforcing this order and its requirements.

And also contrary to Defendant's assertions
kind of throughout this litigation, there is no evidence that the VCA counties, the Voter Choice Act counties, that their plans had already been finalized. There is no evidence in this record that they can point to. In fact, the lang- -- I would point back again to the language of $S B 423$ in Exhibit 7, and when we look at that language, the latter part of this -- of this bill, specifically on the fifth page there, there is 1604 on the very bottom, 1604 of 423 describes a waiver process by which counties, if they wanted to use less than the one per 10,000 number for vote centers, could go through a waiver process with the secretary of state to change the number of locations that they were going to have.

And then on page seven of the legislation, again Exhibit 7, page seven, we then have subsection (4) (c) where it states, "The secretary of state will establish a strike team to assist counties as needed to acquire suitable locations for vote centers, polling places, and consolidated polling places as well as other assets necessary for the safe conduct of the November 3rd, 2020, statewide election."

This bill, again, enacted on August 6, 2020, has these procedures in place to allow counties to, one, get a waiver for how many vote centers they have to have, or polling places that they have to have, and
provides for a strike team to help counties with their polling places and locations.

Why would you need to have that in the legislation if the plans were already finalized? It doesn't make any sense. They clearly weren't finalized and then we put procedures in place to help them make their final plans for where vote centers were going to be.

So again, I mean, it's very clear from the evidence, it wasn't superseded, and there is no evidence in the record for Defendant's assertions that it was except his own self-serving statement on september 30th, 2020 .

Was this -- was this order consistent with previous executive orders? The evidence says no. And I won't delve into it too deeply, but Exhibits 12 through 16 that have been submitted by the Defendant are previous executive orders of Governor's and we can see very clearly if we read through them they are very limited in scope. They are often issued a couple of days before the special election, and in most of those cases, they were issued to allow first responders who were away fighting wildfires to vote by mail. It certainly was not a complete change in our Elections Code for everybody throughout the state. So
really can't look at those as examples of this same kind of power that the Governor used.

Here's a key factor in all of this, and $I$ think very fundamental to many parts of this case. Is this an issue that is likely to recur? I think the Defendant would really like to make this only about executive order $N-67-20$, and say, hey, you know, this case really only centers on that. And it's either, you know, if you want to say that that's null and void, you know, that almost seemed to be okay with that.

But is this an issue -- you know, the key issue here, is this an issue that is likely to recur? And the evidence before you says yes. And I would point to first Exhibits A, D, and 5 are three separate instances this year the Defendant has issued orders relating to elections. And those, again, are the order he issued regarding to a special election earlier this year, the all-mail-ballot election order $N-64-20$, and then, of course, the one that we have highlighted in this case, N-67-20. Three different times he's done it this year alone.

Exhibit $J$ which shows the history, it's from the official secretary of state's website that shows the history of special elections in this state.

THE COURT: What exhibit? I'm sorry,

Counsel.

MR. GALLAGHER: I'm sorry, that's Exhibit J. THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. GALLAGHER: And when we look to that public record, we can see that we have had a special election every year for the last 15 years in California. So we are very likely to have another special election. We've had one in every year for the last 15 years. And again, as $I$ mentioned, there is no end in sight to this emergency. And, in fact -- I mean, I think it's relevant just this last week -- just this week the Governor has announced that he will have a state task force review any vaccine approved by the FDA which will further delay any vaccine made available in California. That's going to further delay the need for an emergency.

And the Governor has continued to assert throughout this litigation that he has the full power, I think in his reply brief in the Motions on Judgment of the Pleadings, say that it is very clear that he has the power to change elections law. That's very clearly in the base of his power. And he continues to maintain that. So it's very likely that he's going to continue to act in this manner.

Exhibit $F$ outlines the 53 orders that -- 53 of the orders the Governor has issued during this
pandemic -- during this pandemic. And when we look at those orders as, you know, my co-plaintiff has pointed out, I mean, they range many different code sections, but $I$ would just point out that these executive orders issued during this pandemic, many of them do change substantive statutory law. They change statutes, and I would just -- $I$ would just point out to you the order $E$ N-28-20, which changes landlord/tenant law in California. We're very familiar with that that it's fundamentally changed the rules regarding landlord/tenant law.

When we look at, as my co-plaintiff pointed out, the changes to paid sick leave, for instance, changes -- what are the statutory rules for when paid sick leave is required. That's N-51-20 in Exhibit -Exhibit F. As my co-plaintiff also pointed out the presumption regarding workers' comp. That is $N-62-20$ which is found on -- in the summary of those provisions are found on page 102 of Exhibit $F$. We changed the rebuttable presumption regarding workers' comp claims overnight. The Governor did. So these are just a few examples of where the Governor continues to fundamentally change, alter, amend state statutes. And as we've argued throughout this case, it's not permitted under the Emergency

Services Act. So, again, all this goes to it is very likely he's going to continue to do so.

And then $I$ would point to Exhibit $G$, our Plaintiffs' Exhibit $G$ which is now he is changing policy with regard to whether or not we can sell gas-powered vehicles in California. You know, very broad overreach of power, and he doesn't even -- he actually doesn't -in this order, if we look at it, he doesn't even reference the Emergency Services Act in doing this. He is now just arbitrarily making policy for the state of California. And, $I$ mean, this is very similar to what a legislature would do. He's establishing a target date of when gas-powered vehicles should be eliminated. Now, look, I understand this isn't the subject of this particular case, but it is evidence of the fact that the Governor continues to overreach his powers, and likely we're going to be in this same situation again.

Normally -- and we have had many policies pass through the legislature that, for example, set targets for carbon emissions. The legislature does that. And we have -- this very -- Exhibit G, the Governor's executive order, that very same policy was considered in the legislature twice in the previous two years, and it failed passage of the legislature. And now he does it by executive order. So therein, again,
we have continued evidence that this governor is not just doing this in an isolated case. This is likely to recur, and that goes certainly to the opposition to the mootness issue in this case, but it also goes to the need for injunctive relief, which we are also requesting in this case where there is clearly evidence that this is likely to recur and continue to be a problem. We don't want to have to see case after case and multiplicity of proceedings to challenge each and every executive order. No, we should expect that the Defendant stays within the lines of the constitution and the California Emergency Services Act. And I think absent an injunction, we aren't going to have -- we cannot be confident that's going to happen.

And that's why we say that -- you know, that
we are -- and when we request the injunctive relief, we are -- if we are determining here today that he doesn't have the power to amend statutes unilaterally, then he must be precluded from doing so in the future. If he does not have the roving power that my co-plaintiff has talked about to enact orders and regulations through any policy change desired, then there must be an injunction that limits his power to some connection with a provision of the Emergency Services Act. They must be necessary, as the Act says, necessary to carry out the
provisions of the Act. That is why injunctive relief is necessary here.

And so, Your Honor, I would just submit that when we look, you know, there's a lot in these binders, right, and I've just tried to cover, $I$ think, the main points on what the evidence shows, but $I$ think when we look at this universe of evidence that's before us, it is very clear that we are entitled to the relief that we sought -- that we seek here today, that the Governor has, in fact, legislated, he has gone beyond the powers that he has both under the Constitution and under the Emergency Services Act, and not only should his order be struck down, but he needs to be enjoined from doing this again because it is very clear that he is already doing it and will continue to do so unless so enjoined.

And with that I would -- I would close.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Killeen, it's 20 minutes to 12:00. You certainly may start, but if you'd like to come back, say, at 1:00 to start, you could certainly do that as well.

MR. KILLEEN: Your Honor, could we take maybe a five-minute break? My material is only 20 or 30 minutes. I think $I$ could knock it out quickly. THE COURT: Sure. We can take a recess.

MR. KILLEEN: At scheduled lengths.
(Recess: 11:38 a.m. to 11:51 a.m.)
THE COURT: The Court will recall Gallagher versus Newsom, CV CS2912. The record will reflect that all parties are present in court as previously announced, and $I$ won't require your formal appearances again, but you certainly may.

Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Killeen?
MR. KILLEEN: I am, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You may.
MR. KILLEEN: Your Honor, before $I$ begin my presentation, $I$ want to respond briefly to one point Mr. Gallagher made, and he said, well, what were Governor Newsom's real motives here, and earlier today the Court excluded Exhibits 3 and 17 on the basis that the Court did not need to get into Governor Newsom's motives and could decide the case solely based on looking at the executive order and looking at the applicable law. So, again, if Governor Newsom's motives are in play, then we would ask the Court to consider Exhibits 3 and 17.

Your Honor, starting with mootness, we've briefed the issue exhaustively. The Court is familiar with it. The Governor formally withdrew this executive order this month, and while Plaintiffs characterized
that as self-serving, however self-serving it is, it is effective. It's an official act of the Governor, and if the Governor were to try to enforce something that he had publicly, in writing, formally withdrawn, this court or any Court in the state would call him to the carpet on that. So the executive order is withdrawn.

Also, even if it were not, an order from this Court would have no effect -- would have no effect on the upcoming election. The ballots have been mailed out; the polling places are set; all of the drop boxes are in place; all of these procedures are governed by $S B$ 423 and will be in place no matter what this Court does, so this Court's ruling will have no practical effect on the election. And as we've briefed, it is too speculative to say what will happen in any future special election.

Turning to the merits, Your Honor, nothing has changed since the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion For Judgment in the pleadings two weeks ago. If their arguments lacked merits two weeks ago, they still lack merit now.

The point of the Emergency Services Act is to enable the State to respond quickly to an emergency. So as Mr. Kiley read from our brief earlier, if the earthquake hits or the fire starts or the dam breaches
or the pandemic explodes, there necessarily is a gap in time between the event and when the legislature is able to pass new legislation. The legislature, by its nature, cannot act as quickly, and so it authorized the Governor to act immediately to deal with emergencies.

In that gap between the emergency and later legislation, not only may the Governor suspend regulatory statutes, but affirmatively he may exercise within the area designated all police power vested in the state by the constitution and the laws of the state of California. Your Honor, it doesn't say all police power vested in the Governor. It says all police power vested in the state. And the other language in that statute is not language of limitation, it's definitional language showing that it's all police power vested in the state.

And, of course, under section 8657 he may also make orders and regulations necessary to carry out that police power. Plaintiffs read section 8627 as the Governor's authority being limited to existing laws of the State of California. So the Plaintiffs state that the Governor can suspend statutes, but he cannot affirmatively put anything in their place in an emergency.

Your Honor, that's not how the California

Supreme Court characterized the ESA in the Macias case. As in the last hearing, $I$ would ask the Court to read Macias closely, and it's telling that the Plaintiffs had not cited or discussed the Macias at all today, because the Supreme Court in the Macias case said that the Governor's emergency powers are, without a doubt, the single most compelling and absolute exercise of sovereign authority that the state, acting through its chief executive, may pursue.

And the Supreme Court specifically said that generally individuals cannot, quote, second guess or affirmatively interfere with a state's decision as to how best to respond to the emergency.

So the discussion that we're having here today, Your Honor, should the Governor have done something in May or August, all of that is encompassed within the Macias court's claim because in every emergency someone is going to be unhappy. In Macias it was a person that was unhappy with the state's medfly infestation and came into court and said you shouldn't have done that, and that's a simplification of something of a complicated case, but that's the gist of it, Your Honor. And then the Supreme Court said, no, in the middle of an emergency these sort of operational decisions cannot be second guessed. So all of these
statements in Macias would make no sense if the Governor was limited to just suspending statutes and sitting on his hands in the hope that the legislature would eventually act. If the Governor can suspend statutes but not direct what will happen next, then you have a vacuum. Local officials are told, while we're suspending this statute, you can't use this, but we're not going to tell you what to do next.

And the local officials would then be stuck waiting, hoping that the legislature would act eventually. Is that how an emergency should be addressed? Of course not. That's why the legislature vested all of the police power of the state in the Governor until the legislature itself can act.

Your Honor, Plaintiffs keep saying, well, the Governor does not legislate. And that's a truism. It's basically three branches of the government. The Governor cannot legislate. But an emergency is the one situation, maybe the only situation, that a legislature literally cannot legislate quickly enough to address all of the problems that arise from an emergency.

Emergencies are different. They are unique situations, and that's why the legislature authorized the Governor to exercise this wide power on a short-term basis.

Your Honor, the legislature has acquiesced
in this understanding of the Emergency Services Act. In Defendant's Exhibits 12 through 16 a clear pattern emerges. In a public emergency that affects an election, the Governor suspends statutes and then affirmatively prescribes the next step, as the Governor did here. Like in 1992, Governor Wilson suspended two statutes and then directed the local officials to accept registrations by a certain date. In 1993 Governor Wilson suspended statutes and then directed elections officials to issue provisional ballots. In 2009, Governor Schwarzenegger suspended statutes and directed elections officials to give provisional ballots to the relevant people. Again in 2009

Governor Schwarzenegger affirmatively directed that firefighters and emergency workers be able to cast their ballots until 10 p.m. not 8 p.m. That's legislation according to the Plaintiffs. And in 2017, Governor Brown issued an executive order related to the wildfires in Sonoma County. At that time, the ESA was not in effect yet, and the county could only hold an all-mail election under certain circumstances even though Sonoma County otherwise would not have been able to hold an all-mail election, Governor Brown suspended the relevant statutes and said you're voting by mail. So in each case the Governor suspended and then the Governor
prescribes.
Are there differences in degree between those executive orders and this case? Absolutely. But that's a function of the fact that this is a bigger emergency. And, Your Honor, one thing we have all been grappling with is that there is very little case law interpreting any Emergency Services Act, but that's largely a function of the fact that this may be the first emergency in the State of California that has affected daily life of all of California's 40 million people to this extent. You look back in history, lots of earthquakes, lots of droughts. Drought might be the closest example. Medfly infestations, a key prong in the ESA law. Wildfires. But this is perhaps the biggest emergency that California has had to face. It's not surprising that the emergency authorities would sweep more broadly in this emergency than they have in other emergencies.

So the Governor is not limited only to suspending statutes. And if the question is -- and if the question here is, again, should the Governor have acted in May instead of August to secure the election? That is exactly the sort of operational decision in the emergency that the California Supreme Court has said cannot be second guessed by the courts.

But even though that decision cannot be second guessed by the courts, it can be second guessed by the legislature. And that brings us to the separation of powers argument.

So there are two features of the Emergency Services Act that make it constitutional. First, the legislature can always end the emergency. And as we discussed at the last hearing, like, yes, that's the extreme option, and the Court expressed some discomfort at the idea that the legislature would just be ending the emergency like this all of the time. But that is a critical distinction in terms of preserving the constitutionality of the act, and that's the big difference between this case and Michigan where there was no check. As soon as the Governor declared the state of emergency, there is no -- there is nothing in the statute that enabled anyone to end it, which the Court found problematic.

Second, short of that, the legislature can continue to legislate, and that's what happened here, Your Honor. In his executive order, the Governor expressly welcomed legislative activity. He said -- he said that nothing in his order would, quote, limit in any way the enactment of legislation concerning the November 3rd, 2020, general election. That's

Defendant's trial Exhibit 5. And once an 860 and SB 423 have been passed, he said, quote, legislation has superceded the following executive orders which have no probative force or effect as of that legislation's effective date, referring to an 860 and $S B 423$. That's Defendant's trial Exhibit 18.

So Your Honor, as we said at the last hearing that's exactly how the system is supposed to work. At the beginning of the emergency, the Governor acted and then the legislature deliberated and superseded that executive action. The legislature's ability to legislate also solves any delegation problem, Your Honor. In terms of how this upcoming election will be conducted, the legislature resolved the fundamental policy issues and provided adequate direction for that policy through an 860 and $S B 423$.

Your Honor, there is no evidence that the Governor ever viewed his executive order as being in conflict with an 860 and $S B 423$ once they passed. Once the legislature enacted an 860 and $S B 423$, they were the law; the executive order was not the law. Were there minor differences between the executive order and the legislation? Yes, there were, but that's not the relevant question. The relevant question is once the legislation has been passed, which one is the law? If
the Governor were here saying my executive order is law, and the legislature were here saying our legislation is law, then we might have a conflict and it would be a very different case.

Your Honor, Plaintiffs have the burden of proof here. They can point to minor differences between the executive order and the legislation, and Mr. Gallagher went into exhaustive detail about intelligent, you know, bar codes and that sort of thing, but they have presented no evidence that Governor Newsom did not yield his executive order to an 860 and $S B 423$. There is no evidence that once that legislation was passed Governor Newsom ever suggested, said anything that his executive order was still in effect. In fact, as we already discussed, he's now formally withdrawn it.

Your Honor, Plaintiffs cite their Exhibit I where the secretary of state referred to the executive order in July, but the secretary of state is not the Governor, and he's not a party here, and even if he were, even the secretary of state confirmed recently that, quote, Assembly Bill 860 and Senate Bill 423 superseded executive orders $N-64-20$ and $N-67-20$ upon their enactment. That's Defendant's trial Exhibit 19 at footnote one. Plaintiffs also rely on the fact that in May Governor Newsom said that the legislation was not
strictly necessary. That's the Cal Niner's article that is their Exhibit H. And that was because in May neither executive -- neither an 860 nor $S B 423$ had been passed. Once they were passed, the executive order gave way to legislation. And again, Your Honor, there is no evidence that after the legislation was passed Governor Newsom ever -- ever did or said anything to suggest that the executive order was still the law rather than the newly enacted an 860 and $S B 423$.

So what evidence is before the Court shows that the Governor intended for legislation to supercede his executive order. He said that explicitly in the executive order itself and that it, in fact, did so. As soon as the executive order was enacted, the Governor withdrew it at the end of the legislative session.

Your Honor, there is no evidence in this record that the Governor ever took the position that the executive order trumped an 860 or SB 423.

As the third DCA recognized, there could be another case where there is a real conflict between the Governor and the legislature, but this is not such a case. And that is why the legislature is not here challenging the Governor's authority. Two members of the legislature are here, but the legislature as a body is not here and has not expressed any dissatisfaction
with Governor Newsom's conduct and has not said, you know, hey, Governor Newsom, we passed SB 423 -- we passed an 860 and SB 423, but you're still asserting that your executive order controls. It's because it hasn't happened.

Your Honor, on the facts of this case, there is no infringement on the legislature's authority and there is no delegation problem because the legislature prescribed what exactly would happen in the November election. And that's why on the facts of this case the Complaint must be dismissed or judgment entered in favor of the Governor.

And, finally, Your Honor, $I$ want to address the remedy briefly. The Complaint challenges executive order $\mathrm{N}-67-20$. If the Court looks at the Complaint, there are no other executive orders listed in the Complaint. If the Court were inclined to rule against the executive order, it can enjoin the executive order, and it can declare what the law means as part of that ruling, but it would be -- as we explained in our pleadings, it would be unright to enjoin future actions of the Governor that have not occurred yet, and the remedy itself would also raise profound separation of problems -- powers problems, Your Honor. If the Court is issuing an order saying, Governor, don't do bad
things in the future, what does that mean? Does that mean that every time the Governor acts in the future he needs to bring it to this Court to -- to -- to check on it before it goes out, or that every plaintiff
throughout the state has standing to bring every executive action back to this Court? I think as we briefed specific legal foundation, the other cases we briefed, such a broad order is not authorized under California law.

I'm done, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you. I did have a question.

So you refer in your briefs and today in terms of this broad police power, correct?

MR. KILLEEN: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Where is that defined? Where is -- where is the authority of the police -- what constitutes -- what elements constitute police power? MR. KILLEEN: Your Honor, I would draw your attention to our -- $I$ think it's our opposition to the Motion For Judgment on the pleadings. There are -Massengil, maybe, comes to mind. Cases defining what the police power means within the respective jurisdiction, and it's a -- it's essentially plenary authority, but, Your Honor, we did address that in one
of our briefs. And we would be happy to provide supplemental briefing on that if the Court wanted to.

THE COURT: I -- plenary authority can mean many things, $I$ would think, especially when it comes to mobilizing law enforcement or other larger issues relative to administrative offices or various departments within the state government. Seems like a leap of police power to cover legislative functions, and I'm wondering if that's truly given to the -- your argument that the writing law is given to the Governor once he's declared a state of emergency and has been vested with these broad police powers.

MR. KILLEEN: Your Honor, I think given the unique circumstances of the Emergency Services Act, that's the -- that's the necessary result because affirmative action will be needed. The Governor is willing to take affirmative action to solve whatever problem is presented to him. So what -- you know, one can characterize it as writing law, but the Governor needs the ability to take steps beyond simply suspending statutes to solve a problem before him while the legislature is deliberating about the issue and while the legislature may potentially supercede the legislation.

THE COURT: So, Counsel, when $I$ look at the
emergency authority powers to the Governor, so this is starting at 8565 and specifically 8567 that all have been briefed, correct? Okay. So it speaks really specifically about amending, rescinding orders, regulations, talks about widespread publicity talk, notice given to all such orders, regulations, amendments and recisions. And in many, many places it talks about the -- it vests authority for amending, rescinding, making directives. There's a lot of power. I don't disagree with you at all regarding the power, but I don't see anywhere in any of the enabling statutes where it actually talks about writing law or enacting statute.

MR. KILLEEN: Your Honor, it does not use the words "enacting statutes," but it does use the words "making orders."

THE COURT: Making orders.
MR. KILLEEN: Right. But that's a question of form over substance if the Governor is saying this is how we're going to conduct the election, whether or not that is just writing a statute or making an order, he can put it in an order like he did here today. He made an order. He made an executive order. That's within his authority.

THE COURT: But if it amends statute, in your view and your client's view, that is lawful under
the state of emergency and ESA?
MR. KILLEEN: He already has the authority to suspend statutes, Your Honor. He can just say, we're suspending the statute. So the question is what's the next step? Who makes the decision to fill that gap. And in this case, the legislature ultimately made that decision, but in that gap while the legislature was working, the Governor started the process, and I would direct the Court to the findings the Governor made in the executive orders. The Court can give whatever weight the Court wants to, but in his findings, the Governor was describing the serious challenges the state might be facing in the November election given that we did not know what the pandemic looked like and given the high degree of uncertainty in April and May that was affecting all of our lives, and we just -- we didn't know, Your Honor, and so the Governor was using his emergency authority to start the complicated and difficult and uncertain process of securing the election when it needed to -- when it needed to start.

And then, Your Honor, just returning to a point you started discussing with me at the beginning of this. 8627 is in some sense a catchall statute. The Emergency Services Act gives the Governor many enumerated powers. It says the Governor can come onto
your property and do all these things, but the legislature wisely anticipated that emergencies come in many different shapes and sizes, and there might be something that the Governor needs to do that is not within those enumerated powers, and that's why it included the catchall in 8627 and vested the Governor with -- with this extraordinary language.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anything else at this time?

MR. KILLEEN: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Gallagher?
MR. GALLAGHER: Your Honor, just very
briefly.
I -- I don't know what Defendant could cite in case law that says that there is no difference between orders and statutes. I think there would be many things we could cite in case law that shows that there is a very big difference.

Orders and regulations have always been seen
as executive powers to administer. Very clear. They are not -- they don't -- they are not interchangeable with statutes. Statutes are legislative in nature, legislative powers. They are passed by the legislature and then ultimately signed into law by the Governor. There is a very clear distinction. So, you know, if --
if that is Defendant's argument, he would need to cite something that says orders and statutes are interchangeable. That's not the case.

And to the point about police power which you inquired into, police power is also seen as an executive power. It's not a legislative power. It's an executive power. The police power is the enforcing - enforcing of the law.

So to now somehow change that into, no, it includes legislative powers, again, cite to me the case law that says that. I mean, the plain -- again, a plain reading of the statutes, $I$ think very clearly says he has strong executive powers, but they are very clear to draw the distinction that he doesn't have certain legislative powers. Right? And even the suspension statute, Defendant's making this argument that, well, if you have this power to suspend, then you have to have the power to insert something in behind it.

Well, just look at the statute itself. It's very clear, 8571 , where it says, "During a state of war emergency or a state of emergency, the Governor may suspend --" and this is where it gets specific, "any regulatory statute, or statute described in the procedure for conduct of state business or the orders, rules or regulations," again orders, rules or
regulations, executive administrative of any state agency, "including subdivision D of section 1253 of the Unemployment Insurance Code." So it's very specific.

And then it clarifies, "where the Governor determines and declares that strict compliance with any statute, order, rule, or regulation would in any way prevent, hinder, or delay the mitigation of the effects of the emergency."

The whole intent behind the plain reading of the statute is if something is getting in the way of - of, again, preventing, hindering, or delaying the mitigation of the effects of the emergency, then you can remove that obstacle out of the way. But there is nothing in there that says, oh, but also, you get to put something in there. It is very clear it doesn't allow for that. It allows for you to remove the obstacle by suspending that for the specific statutes. It is very plain reading. We don't need to convolute it. It certainly doesn't say in 8571 that there is the additional ability to put something in place behind the suspension. It's not there. And this is what the Defendant continues to try to do is sort of add something in it where it's not in the statute. Whereas we have very clearly interpreted here is what the statute says and here is what it means. And we have to
stick to the plain language and reading of the statute.
MR. KILEY: Your Honor, if I may just
briefly add. And $I$ have other points $I$ want to respond to, but $I$ can very well integrate that into the close as well depending upon how the Court wants the rest of the day to proceed.

But my co-counsel said it exactly right.
And if you look at the way that the Emergency Services Act and this provision has been used, that's the way it has been used by past governors. Even the orders they cite only deal with suspension. They don't deal with, you know, creating affirmative policies. And this notion of gap filling is a total fix because look what happened in this case. The Governor declared we were going to have an all-mail election, and then he needed to pass various policies related to that. That wasn't filling in any gaps that were existing. That was creating an affirmative policy, a new policy, and that's what we see with these various other orders that we've been citing throughout the course of today's proceeding is that it involves the creation of affirmative policies, not merely the suspension of statutes that are getting in the way or imposing requirements that get in the way of dealing with the emergency.

THE COURT: Counsel, $I$ think everyone in
this room would agree that our right to vote and to vote safely is critically important, and if the election statutes as they were written or -- and have been written except for this little window between now and November the 3rd, if it was believed that they could -we could not run a general election as we're accustomed to having them in our community, certainly none of us would have been okay with saying, well, we'll postpone the election, or everyone who is in power right now can stay in power. I don't think any of us would be comfortable with that.

So can we agree that something needed to be done in order to help ensure that people could -- that the registered voters could vote and that they could vote safely? I think we could agree to that.

MR. GALLAGHER: Right. And again, our main
argument is the legislature was already acting to do just that and, in fact, did do that. So again, what was the urgency and where in the evidence in the record is the urgency that the Governor needed to act outside of the legislative process? There is no evidence before us that really proves that point.

The evidence that is before us shows the legislature was already doing this and providing those because they did understand that there was a need to
respond. But as a secondary, just following the reasoning there, could it reasonably -- could this election reasonably have been conducted safely under existing statute? Everyone who did not want to go to the polls could ask for a mail ballot and could sign up for an absentee ballot. There is nothing in the law that precluded that. So anyone who is concerned about safety and going to the actual polls under the existing statute that was already there could request and get a mail ballot. So the law was no impediment to that. Right? And then otherwise, we provided for in-person voting, which the Governor's order does too. So you could very rationally argue that under the existing statutory structure, yes, you could have had a safe election. You know, that people could have decided to vote by mail, all those that wanted to instead of the polls, and we could have had, you know, polling places like we normally do or vote centers in the case of Voter Choice Act counties.

So, again, $I$ mean rationally is there really, again, that -- that you had to get rid of the statutory scheme in order to necessarily deal with the emergency? I don't think there's been any showing of that.

MR. KILLEEN: Your Honor, two points. One,
that's exactly the sort of second guessing that the Macias Court foreclosed because they said earlier in an emergency where extreme action needs to be taken someone is going to be unhappy. Why didn't you spray my field instead of his field? Why did you put a polling place over there instead of over here? That will happen in every emergency, and the California Supreme Court said the Governor gets to make that call, again, unless the legislature comes in later and supersedes it. But the Governor gets to make that call.

Your Honor, going back to the police power, we did address this on page 13 in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion For Judgment in the pleadings. The Court can refer to that, but we did cite the Massengil case --

THE COURT: I did see that. Please go ahead.

MR. KILLEEN: Right. Massengil 102 Cal. App. 4th 498, and the Candid Enterprises case, 39 Cal 3d 878 which describes the police power as the, quote, plenary authority to govern.

Again, Your Honor, if you want more briefing on what the police power is, we'd be happy to provide that, but that certainly should get the Court where it needs to go.

MR. KILEY: Your Honor, if $I$ may on that, Macias, because this case has been grossly mischaracterized. If you look at what was actually decided in the case, the issue presented to the court was the liability of a third party to provide warnings that -- in a way that interfered and overrode what the Governor was doing. So he's sort of trying to compare a conflict between a private party and the government somehow is analogous between to the legislative and executive branches.

But more importantly, if you look at what actually happened in that case, it illustrates precisely our interpretation of the Emergency Services Act. The Macias Court did not cite 8627. They -- you know, you would think that there was this provision that was a catchall to give the Governor the power to do whatever he wants. They would have mentioned that. It's not cited anywhere in the case. The provision they cited of the Emergency Services Act was 8569 where it says, "the Governor is charged with the responsibility to coordinate the emergency plans and programs of all local agencies. Such plans and programs to be integrated into and coordinated with the state emergency plan, and the plans and programs of the federal government and of the states to the whole extent possible." It goes on to
say, "the Governor thereupon implemented the state's peace time emergency plan calling upon all state agencies to utilize the personnel, equipment, and facilities at their disposal to alleviate the emergency invoking a specific type of plan that is specifically authorized in a specific provision of the Emergency Services Act."

But moreover, the court doesn't stop there, it goes on to cite something like eight or nine different provisions of the food and agricultural code that the state's response was being conducted pursuant to. We haven't heard any sections of the Elections Code in this case that the Governor's response was executed pursuant to. So the notion that Macias somehow stands for the proposition that the Governor has just unlimited and unbounded power under the Emergency Services Act is not borne out by the actual text of that decision. THE COURT: Counsel?

MR. KILLEEN: Your Honor, I already read the plain text of the decision to the Court earlier. The Court can read it. It's quite broad, and it's one of the, what, three, four, five cases that actually construe the Emergency Services Act, and it, along with all of the others, envisions a very, very broad authority on the Governor's behalf.

THE COURT: I don't think any -- I certainly am convinced that the Governor has great authority, very broad authority under the Emergency Services Act. I just don't read anywhere in -- in the legislation, in the enabling statutes that define the authority. I don't find any language regarding amending statutes or writing law. I just don't find that. And I do think that that may be something you'll want to brief that will -- will decide that, I guess, before we finish up today.

MR. GALLAGHER: Well, I mean, if I might, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GALLAGHER: Because it's not there is the -- is the problem. It's not in the statute that provides that authority. And again, if indeed this statute is interpreted as -- as Defendant is asserting right now, he's saying they have all power of government in the Governor during an emergency.

One, I'd have to ask myself, I mean, looking
at the language of the Governor -- I mean the legislature who wrote the law, clearly outlined very specific -- they use specific words. They use statutes here; they didn't use it elsewhere. They were very clear in defining, when you look at the plain language
of the statute, what his authority is. So I think it's very clearly outlined there. But if you're saying, as -- if Defendant is really asserting that the legislature said we are going to give you all of our power during an emergency and that's what the Emergency Services Act means, then it must clearly be unconstitutional. It would have to be struck down completely. In a way, the Defendant is being his own worst enemy here with trying to claim that kind of power. It's not in the statute. But if they clearly -if they really want to keep asserting that position, they are going to be -- they are going to be in danger of losing the entire Act based on the very clear reasoning of constitutional law and the recent Michigan case that we have cited to. And that can't possibly be the case that under an emergency we give away all legislative power to the Governor completely because that -- that appears to be what Defendant is arguing right now.

MR. KILLEEN: Your Honor, the legislature is not giving away anything. They can still legislate, and in this case, they legislated and superseded the Governor's executive order. In some extreme case where you have a governor going rogue, the legislature can end the emergency just like that.

THE COURT: But truly, we talked about this yesterday, I think, or earlier in one of our sessions - -

MR. RUSSELL: Two weeks ago.
THE COURT: -- two weeks ago, clearly that is not a viable option with a pandemic. That is not a viable option with a pandemic. Surely the legislature would -- if those -- given those choices that -- I'm speaking for the legislature here, but if $I$ were a legislature, I would prefer to feed on the issue of the revision of the law or the writing of the law and make sure that the rest of the emergency orders are in place to ensure that the -- however many million we are -- 30 million?

MR. GALLAGHER: 35 million, almost 40
million.

THE COURT: 30 million people in California can be as safe as reasonable -- reasonably possible and still go about their work and their -- meeting their needs and for survival. And so I don't - - I don't think that that's even an option. It may be that the Emergency Services Act may need to be amended in some way or may need -- may require some kind of, $I$ don't know, dates when it would expire and then be renewed or -- or a little window, a little authority to work with the Governor for quick legislation if it's, in
fact, needed, but I'm not even sure that's allowable at this point. I'm not sure even that would be -- might be violative of the Constitution. I don't know. But for greater minds than mine. I just think this is -- I think this is really an important point of the case, and what's occurred, and I'm not prepared to make my ruling today. I do want to hear closing from all of you. It's 12:30. Unless you feel that -- I think I understood that both sides wanted to close. Okay. So do you want to --

MR. GALLAGHER: I'm -- I think we're fine to
proceed if you wanted to continue, or --
THE COURT: Do you need a break? Excuse me?
MR. KILEY: Could we have a 20-minute lunch break and then come back and close?

THE COURT: We'll take a half an hour break -- half an hour break and come back at 1:00 o'clock.

MR. KILLEEN: Your Honor, would we be able to push through? Our closing is four sentences long. Theirs is 15 minutes. Could we just push through?

MR. KILEY: That is my portion. Fine.
MR. GALLAGHER: Whatever the pleasure of the
Court is. I think we would be fine to continue and do our closing, but --

THE COURT: Does anyone need a five-minute
break?

All right. Proceed.
MR. KILEY: Just one moment, Your Honor, I want to respond to a few items raised by the Defendant. And I'd like to provide a more detailed legal analysis of the relevant statutes and constitutional provisions of the case law in play.

First of all, the claim that the Governor has withdrawn this executive order has just been made for the first time in this litigation. The word "withdrawn" has never been used. By contrast, there are several executive orders where the Governor does explicitly state he is withdrawing a previous order such that it is no longer operative. That term has never been used here. The Governor has expressed an opinion as to the relationship between the executive order and the legislation saying one superseded the other.

Counsel's assertion that the Governor has withdrawn the order is not supported by the record and is, in fact, directly contradicted by it.

MR. GALLAGHER: Yeah, I was confused by that as well. Maybe just a quick question. I don't know if this is appropriate. But quick, are you saying it was withdrawn by his September -- by Exhibit 9?

MR. KILLEEN: Exhibit 9?

MR. GALLAGHER: I'm sorry, by Exhibit 19 -or, sorry, Exhibit 18 .

MR. KILLEEN: That was the Governor's formal
withdrawal of the executive order.

MR. GALLAGHER: Well, I would just point to that exhibit. It's -- the exact wording as he says it is superseded by. I don't see any statement in that Exhibit 18 , which we can all read for ourselves, that the Governor has withdrawn his order. He states, again, and $I$ would say this is a conclusory statement, that his order has been superseded by an 860 and $S B 423$.

MR. KILLEEN: Your Honor, he says that the -- that the executive orders have no further force or effect as of the legislation's effective date. I'm not sure what else the Governor could say that would say it would be withdrawn.

THE COURT: You know, the code talks -repeatedly talks about rescission. Talks about having the order -- orders, regulating it -- help me find the language. Talks about -- I believe it talks about -amend regulations, amendments or recisions thereof. You see that language again and again and again. And I'm interested that that word isn't being used. It's -I -- I might sound like I'm splitting hairs but there are a lot of different words. In fact, when we were in
court two weeks ago and I said, well, is suspended, withdrawn, are all of these terms being used interchangeably. What $I$ was looking for at that time was the rescission and that exact language because I didn't see it -- I haven't seen it used, and $I$ haven't heard the activities that have been going on relative to the executive order in question or others. I don't hear that rescission order, and even in -- I think -- is it No. 18 or 19 -- in 18, the final acts, doesn't use that language either.

MR. KILLEEN: Your Honor, I believe two weeks ago when the Court asked that question $I$ said yes. THE COURT: But I did not use the term "rescission."

MR. KILLEEN: So I'll have to go back and check -- so I'll go back and check the transcript, Your Honor. I think I communicated that whatever the magic word is the Court used in the executive order is gone now for lack of a better term.

THE COURT: Anyway, it may be splitting
hairs, and it talks about the broad notice, the really -- it's not just quietly it doesn't mean anything anymore, it talks about the broad notice.

MR. GALLAGHER: That he would make it very publicly -- yeah, in the statute. And you're right. I
mean, in -- in 8567 it's make, amend, and rescind orders and regulations. Of course, our point is it really doesn't matter what you say. You can say that something is superseded, but as we pointed out, the facts show the order is still being enforced. Exhibit 19 is very clear on that. It still says VCAs don't have to have meetings. The only source of authority for that is the existing order. You know, it's still requiring intelligent mail bar code even though there's nothing in the legislation of the sort. Right? So just because you say something, oh, this is no longer in effect, that doesn't mean that it actually is. This is a conclusory statement for the purposes of this litigation, but it doesn't mean that, in fact, that has occurred. And I think that's what the -- the facts of this case and the evidence before us clearly shows.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. KILLEEN: Your Honor, may I respond to that?

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. KILLEEN: So, Your Honor, as I said earlier, there is no evidence that the Governor has taken the position in any way, shape, or form that executive order has any force or effect after the legislation was enacted. Plaintiffs have pointed to two
statements of the secretary of state and extrapolated that the order is still being enforced. The secretary of state is not a party here. If the secretary of state is illegally enforcing orders after the -- after the Governor has withdrawn or rescinded them, then the Plaintiffs can take that up with the secretary of state. But there is no evidence on this record that the Governor has treated these -- his order as anything other than withdrawn or superseded after the legislation was passed. And even the secretary of state in Exhibit 19, footnote 1, himself confirmed that an 860 and SB 423 superseded the executive order.

MR. GALLAGHER: Right.
MR. KILLEEN: So if someone has a problem with the secretary of state, they can take it up with the secretary of state, but the secretary of state is not a party here, and there is no evidence that the Governor has treated the executive order as still in effect.

MR. GALLAGHER: And the issue is not about who is doing it. The issue is: Is the order still in effect and being enforced? That's the issue. And it, in fact, is, and the secretary of state is an executive agency. They are charged with executing elections in the state. That's primarily their duty, and then also,
you know, dealing with business formations and et cetera, you know, they have an executive function. They are definitely part of the executive.

But to his point -- his footnote in
Exhibit 19, okay, they -- again, he says that the order has been superseded but then the very same document they go on to tell VCAs that they don't have to have meetings. You know, I mean, and there's no -- where is the source of authority for that? It could only be the order. Again, like, so when you look at the facts of what they are saying in this document, there's a difference between what you say and what you're actually doing. And we're concerned here with whether the order is actually being enforced. It is. And there's really -- I don't think there's any dispute about that, at least not in the facts of the record.

MR. KILLEEN: Your Honor, the secretary of state is an independent constitutional officer. If you want to enjoin the Governor based on what the secretary of state is doing, we'd be thrilled to take that up.

And second, even if this were relevant, and it's not, there actually is not evidence that anything has happened on the ground. There is a director from the secretary of state that we're all interpreting as what is happening or not, but there is not actually any
evidence of what is happening in the counties right now. As the Court does not need to go down this rabbit hole because there is no evidence as to the Governor. But the only evidence we have are speculations based on these directives.

THE COURT: Well, during emergencies -- it seems to me that during emergencies especially, but at other times as well, it is wise and useful to use the prescribed language for a specific act. So saying withdrawn, suspended, I don't know -- I don't know really what those words meant to you or to your client, but I did think $I$ knew what rescinded meant. And I think that in emergencies it's important to be precise, particularly when there are so many things happening at the county level, at the city level. People's lives are really turned upside down with this pandemic and distance learning and all of the things that -- remote working, everything people are having to deal with, $I$ do think there's something to be said during an emergency to use the official language that is in the code. And that's just an observation. But...

MR. KILLEEN: Sure, Your Honor. And if this case hinges on the piece of paper that the Governor uses to withdraw this executive order, we would -- we would be happy to consult with our client and use the
appropriate form as the Court needed.
THE COURT: And that's fine. I just -- it's just really more of an observation and suggestion. It's not that $I$ require the wording. It's that the code seems to have chosen that word for the purposes of clarity. That's how I read it.

One of the things $I$ was wondering early on in this case was why there wasn't anything before the Court that had shown the rescission. But it had -seems -- doesn't appear that it was an act on a specific day. It was sort of a rolling suspension or a rolling withdrawal, or a rolling -- I don't know that it's actually been a rescission, though. I don't know if there was technically a specific date.

Do you think there is?
MR. KILLEEN: So, Your Honor, Exhibit 18 was
the formal withdrawal, rescindence (sic), rescission of the executive order throughout the summer --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. KILLEEN: -- as legislation -- as
legislation has been passed the Governor has been consistently saying that his executive order has been superseded in various cases. This is one of several cases where the executive order has been challenged, but Exhibit 18 is the -- is the formal act of the Governor
withdrawing the executive order.
MR. GALLAGHER: But again, even that is suspect, Your Honor. It's suspect, right, because the -- these bills we're talking about that supposedly superseded the order were passed on June 18th, the first one, and the second one was passed on August 6th.

Why didn't the Governor say when he signed those bills that it superseded his order at that time? Instead we have a statement on September 30 th, you know, more than a month after these bills had already been signed by him, right, that he finally says, oh, I consider these things superseded, and he kind of lumps it in with other things, other bills as well. These supercede my previous orders on September 30th, you know. I mean, that's -- and again, it's a conclusory statement. He doesn't use the word "rescind." He doesn't use the word "withdrawn." He hasn't used that word at all. It's just been in this litigation that there's been this argument about whether or not the bill superseded the order, and that's why you see the word "superseded" used.

It was first used by counsel in this
litigation contending that there was -- that the legislation superseded the order, and, therefore, the case is moot. You know, and I think it's telling that
the Governor on September 30 th uses that same term, again, months after the bills had already passed.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right.
Mr. Kiley, I think you were closing.
MR. KILEY: All right. Thank you very much,
Your Honor. I'll just -- I'll address a couple other things that were brought up by the opposition.

You know, the first is this idea that, well, the legislature just can't act quickly enough. That's kind of the main thread of their arguments. And, you know, to the extent that that's true, that's the reason why executive powers are vested in the executive branch and why the legislature in 1970 came to a policy determination to delegate the implementation of particular policies relating to combatting emergencies to the executive branch with a detailed law with hundreds -- or with dozens of sections that, as they acknowledge, has been utilized by Governor's for the last 50 years. But their interpretation says that in addition to all of that, the legislature tacked on a provision that said, oh, by the way, you can have all of our powers too and do whatever you deem is necessary from a policy making standpoint. And there's no precedent for that. There is no law behind that, and it certainly isn't allowed by the principles of our

Constitution as we're going to discuss. And to the extent that new circumstances present a need for a new policy, well, that happens all of the time. The legislature makes new policies every year that you might have social harms if they didn't exist, and the legislature has the ability to act very quickly as circumstances warrant. So this sort of fear they are trying to stoke is there would be no means to address clear and present dangers in the absence of a full usurpation of legislative power by the executive branch are simply not borne out.

And then the second issue $I$ wanted to address was this idea that, you know, there has not really been a conflict between the executive and legislative branches here, and $I$ think that counsel said that the legislature has expressed no dissatisfaction with the Governor's conduct. But, of course, that's not the test. The separation of powers inquiry doesn't turn on whether, you know, the current legislature and the current governor, you know, happen to be getting along in one way or another. The question is whether the Governor is acting pursuant to lawful authority that is vested in him by the Constitution or by statute. Indeed, it's a very clearly-established principle that the legislature cannot willingly delegate legislative
power, and sometimes it might even want to do. Our Constitution does not permit the legislature to give the Governor the power to legislate, as I'll address more in just a moment.

But this particular case is actually a very clear example of why courts insist upon a separation between the legislative and executive powers and why that's a fundamental principle of our Constitution because, you know, let's assume we take their arguments on face value. Let's assume for the sake of argument that in this particular case there needed to be a signal or direction, as they put it, as to how to conduct the election sooner than the legislature could complete the legislative process. And all of this kind of factual since the legislature could have completed the process much more quickly. That would nevertheless not be justification for an unlawful executive order. An executive order is a binding command. It's not some signal. It's not guidance. It's a command. It's law that can be enforced. So, you know, if the Governor had wanted to provide some signal, he could have supported -- expressed support for the legislation that was moving through the process. In fact, it's actually very common that stakeholders need to start making preparations based upon their anticipation of what policy will
ultimately be formulating. But the important thing is that by opting not to do that, but by opting instead to make binding law himself, the Governor crossed a constitutional line and that had consequences as far as the policy that was ultimately formed. Because if his goal was truly to facilitate the necessary planning by elections offices while waiting passage of legislation, he was assuming the legislation would mirror or be very similar to the order that he enacted and it would, in fact, give the legislature a reason not to have too much of a difference from it because then if the county elections offices had started making preparations one way according to his order and the legislature came out and passed a law that required something completely different that would have created chaos, not the certainty that they were asking for. So it forced the legislature's hand basically towards the Governor's preferred policy outcome, and the Governor could exploit that logic on almost any issue by declaring the policy himself and then inviting the legislature to take action to, quote, ratify it, is a term that they use, which is exactly backwards from the way it's supposed to work under the Constitution, right, with the legislature passing bills and then the Governor signs it. The Governor could use that tool to always stack the deck of
the legislative process towards whatever he wanted by making it so that, you know, just by making that the law from the get go, you know, instead of having a budget actually get passed and be appropriate, he could start spending it, and then half the legislature hopefully then have it approved afterwards, but that's not the way that our system of government works.

So getting down to the core legal principles here of separation of powers, we've already discussed how Article III, Section 3 of the California Constitution continues an explicit separation of powers provision that not even the United States Constitution has, and for the Governor, the California Supreme Court has been very clear about what this means. Unless permitted by the Constitution, the Governor may not exercise legislative powers. That's Harbor v. Deukmejian, the California Supreme Court. And by the way, unless permitted by the Constitution caveat, that accounts for the Governor's one use of what might be deemed legislative power, and that's vetoing legislation. There's a quote from the case of state versus Holder that our Supreme Court has approved several times that the executive in any Republican form of government has only a qualified and destructive legislative function and never creative legislative
power. Never creative legislative power.
So this is the idea behind the nondelegation doctrine which our supreme court has said is well established in California. The California Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that the power to change a law of the state is necessarily legislative in character and is vested exclusively in the legislature and cannot be delegated by.

And what's the reason for that? Why do we have this constitutional principle that even a willing legislature cannot give the Governor the power to legislate. Well, the Supreme Court has said in the case of Cutler v. Yocum that it rests upon the premise that the legislative body must itself effectively resolve the truly fundamental issues. It cannot escape responsibility by explicitly delegating that function that others or by failing to establish an effective mechanism to assure the proper implementation of its policy decisions. And sometimes the legislature might even like the agency or the Governor himself to hande these decisions, but the reason that our constitutional doesn't allow that according to the supreme Court in Cutler is to preserve the representative character of the process of reaching legislative decision.

That's what's been missing in all of these
orders that cover so many different types of policy that exercise creative legislative power, which they don't even contest, is the representative character of the process.

But in this case, we're concerned with the nondelegation doctrine as it applies to one statute, the Emergency Services Act, because, again, it needs to be emphasized that's the only authority the Governor has cited in this action. That's the only authority cited in the executive order and statute and that there's never been anything more specific cited.

As we mentioned, a similar statute in Michigan was deemed unconstitutional precisely on this basis because it violated the nondelegation doctrine. The Michigan statute does what the Governor claims California's does, it gives the Governor power to act as she deems necessary to protect life and limb which is the same words quoted by the Defendant in the section of his briefing on the so-called police power. The Michigan Supreme Court held that this delegated legislative power, because the Governor, once the statute passed, could use to it create new policy across any domain without any guidance from the legislature other than it was necessary.

The Court held the word "necessary" wasn't
enough to guide guidance to transform an otherwise impermissible delegation of legislative power into a permissible delegation of executive power.

And this is the actual words of the Court here: The contagions, accidents, misfortunes, and risks and acts of God ordinarily and inevitably associated with the human condition and with our everyday social experiences are simply too various for this standard to apply any meaningful litigation upon the exercise of the delegated powers.

Simply put, the Emergency Stop Powers Law intended for the necessary standard just as for the - -

CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER: Mr. Kiley.
MR. KILEY: I'm too fast again?
Neither supplies genuine guidance to the Governor as to how to exercise the authority delegated to her, nor constrains her actions in any meaningful manner.

Better?

CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER: A little better.

MR. KILEY: Now, as they've raised in that, as the Defendant has raised in his brief, this Court acknowledged, in Michigan is actually not that common for laws to be struck down under the Nondelegation

Doctrine, but the Court in that case added if the emergency powers law does not constitute an excessive delegation of power under our Constitution, what ever would?

And that's the question $I$ ask today as far as how they've interpreted this Act and you've heard it in the oral argument today. If that doesn't constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, then what ever would?

So specifically the constitutionality of this Act would turn on whether the statute provides enough guidance for how the Governor exercises the power conferred. And, if anything, California Supreme Court actually takes the issue of unlawful delegation more seriously than Michigan's.

So then the question is whether the statute has enough guidance as to how the Governor is exercising his or her authority so that it is not an unlawful delegation and it's not delegating legislative power. For a statute to contain enough guidance in Michigan, the legislature must include intelligible principles of guidance, but our Supreme Court requires something more, an effective mechanism to assure the proper implementation of his policy decisions. It is often described as applying primary standards for the
implementation of the policy, suitable safeguards to guide the powers used, and a yardstick guiding the administrator.

So this is a question that has not been answered by the Defendant at any point in this litigation is what is the effective mechanism yardstick or primary standards in the Emergency Services Act to guide the Governor's use of powers granted by the Act and assure their proper implementation. Rather than providing such a yardstick or pointing to any such guidance, they've argued that the Act provides plenary authority to govern, however that might be defined, and unrestricted police power caveated only by what the Governor deems necessary.

So this admits of no limit on executive stretch, no yardstick, no mechanism, no primary standard in the statute itself to guide the executive in exercising the powers conferred. It's precisely what the nondelegation doctrine permits by the precedents of our own supreme court, and by the logic of the Michigan Supreme Court it would have to be struck down as unconstitutional.

However, that is not the only option before the Court because we've offered an alternative interpretation of the Act. And our state Supreme Court
has made it very clear that when you have two competing interpretations of a statute, one of which would raise doubts as to its constitutionality, then you go with the one that doesn't raise at least as many doubts about its constitutionality. And that's the key thing for the Court here to give what the so-called constitutional avoidance can wait, the Court need not even be convinced that their interpretation is unconstitutional but only that it would raise questions, raise doubts as to its constitutionality, and I'll give you a couple of precedents on that from People v. Amore of California Supreme Court.
"California Courts must adopt an interpretation of a statutory provision which is consistent with the statutory language and purpose, eliminates doubts as in the provisions of constitutionality."

Or you can look at the City of Los Angeles v. Bellridge where it said you should go with the construction that will render the act valid in its entirety or free from doubt as to its constitutionality even though the other construction is equally reasonable.

This rule is based on the presumption that the legislative body intended not to violate the

Constitution.
So that's kind of the setup I want to provide for our interpretation of the Act that even if you viewed the two interpretations as equally reasonable or even if you thought the Defendant's was somewhat more reasonable, if they were both plausible interpretations of the Act, the Court should adopt Plaintiffs' in order to avoid the very clear constitutional question that their interpretation would raise and there can be simply no doubt that there is at least a constitutional question given that the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan has struck down their comparable statute on that basis.

So as we mentioned, the Emergency Services Act is a rather lengthy statute. The version I've been looking at is a hundred-some pages. And those provisions are detailed generally relating to mobilizing different agencies of government to deal with the emergencies.

To contrast that by omission, theirs is a very small statute that basically just includes the provision that they relied on in this case. They suggest that the provisions that they relied on in this case, the police power act statute.

So there are only actually three -- three
provisions that we've been discussing today so $I$ won't belabor the point. There are only three sections that they have cited for authority. 8571, again, is the power to suspend certain statutes, and they have conceded -- the Defendant has conceded that the executive order did more than this. They have instead tried to justify and claim that the Act provides authority to provide what they call corresponding affirmative direction.

So we can remove that as a plausible basis for justifying what happened here. And notably, by the way, in the executive orders that they have produced from these five -- these five executive orders from prior governors, that's the only provision that's cited in this order is 8571 which is clear that for those governors they were viewing the Act to provide the ability to suspend a certain requirement as those orders did but were not claiming that these two other provisions then gave them policy-making authority or that that's what those orders did.

So 8567, this is the one that talks about rules, orders, and regulations. It authorizes certain orders and regulations to carry out the provisions of this chapter. Since there is no provision in the chapter on overhauling elections, Defendant is instead
forced to stretch this text to give the Governor authority not just to issue orders and regulations to carry out the provisions of the Act, but to create whole new statutes to do absolutely anything. This is inconsistent with, among other things, the expressed text in the Emergency Services Act that refers to lawful orders and regulations within the limits of the Governor's authority provided herein.

As the Court has pointed out as well, the term "orders and regulations" is -- has a very different bearing than "statutes" which is a term that's used elsewhere in the Act when it comes to the power of suspension.

So it's very clear what the limits, and again, the text $I$ referred to specifically refers to limits in the Act on what orders and regulations can be used for. They must be tied to provisions of the Act in order to implement those provisions. So, anyway, there is all kinds of provisions, which you mentioned several of them, Your Honor, that deal with topics such as food safety, curfews, disaster worker classification which all grant authority to the Governor --
(Whereupon the Certified Shorthand Reporter
motioned to Mr. Kiley to speak more slowly.)
MR. KILEY: -- or other officials to issue
orders and regulations. This is the statutory scheme. Section 8567 confers the authority to carry out the provisions of this chapter and the relevant provisions that echo that authority.

That scheme, that fits more comfortably within the California Supreme Court's framework for the lawful delegation of implementation authority to the executive branch.

Defendant's conception of freewheeling lawmaking authority does not fit within that framework. And this will be relevant to the question of relief today as well, which my co-counsel will discuss, is that the framework of this statute which would have the Governor issue orders and regulations only in as much as they are tied to provisions of the statute and are carrying out those provisions should be part of any injunctive relief granted in this case to ensure that that is the use the Governor is making of this Act.

Finally, we've discussed police power, 8627, at some length. But it should be noted again that the Governor has lifted them out of context, just, you know, and notwithstanding disputes as to what police power itself means and the lack of any significant authority on that question.

They have lifted -- the Defendant has lifted
those words out of context to suggest that they provide plenary authority to govern and centralize the State's powers in the hands of the Governor. And again, if that is, in fact, what those words did, you wonder why the legislature bothered writing the rest of the Act at all. If this, in fact, was a catchall that provided unlimited power as Defendant claims.

So, Your Honor, to sum up the main, we think, options that are before the Court, the order here we believe -- the statute here we believe can be interpreted in a way that would not require it to be struck down under the reasonings, at least, provided by the Michigan Supreme Court and that is clearly delineated in decisions of the California Supreme Court. And that is by using -- by interpreting these provisions in the way that we have offered the court and in the way the plain reading suggests.

That the first 8571, as its plain language suggests, offers the power to suspend, not the power to create.

The next provision dealing with orders and regulations, those must be tied to specific provisions and specific purposes in the Emergency Services Act. And then the police power section is also limited because it clearly states that it must be exercised in
accordance with section 8567 's orders and regulations. So that's the clear language of limitation. They claim this is just the language of definition, but, in fact, it's right there in 8627 referring back to the other section as the mechanism by which the court is to exercise the powers that are granted.

So if the Court is inclined towards that interpretation of the statute, we believe that there is not as clear a case, at least, that the statute must be struck down in its entirety. But if we accept Defendant's interpretation, then they have provided us no real basis to avoid that conclusion because the one distinction the Defendant has tried to draw relating to the ability of the legislature to terminate the emergency, as Your Honor has pointed out, is not a viable option and is not relevant to the separation of powers inquiry which is about whether there is an effective mechanism within the Emergency Services Act's words itself to guide the exercise of power by the executive branch. That's the inquiry specifically that our Supreme Court requires; that's the inquiry that was undertaken by the Michigan Supreme Court. And the fact that today's legislature, if it wanted, might have the ability, theoretically, to terminate the entire emergency in order to, say, disapprove of this
particular executive order in this case, that simply isn't pertinent to the separation-of-powers analysis.

So with that, I'd like to allow my
co-counsel to handle the rest of our closing.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. GALLAGHER: Thank you, Your Honor.
I think $I$ would just end here and sum up by saying, why -- why are we here today? You know. I think we've all said this is a very important case, and it's important because it goes to the fundamental center of who we are as Americans. And our system of government, and the preservation of that system of government, the ideals behind it that we don't have an accumulation of power, that we have separate powers, that we have checks and balances is important. And the process that is part of that system of government is important. It's not a minor thing to deviate from the process that's outlined in our system of government.

Now, we all admit here today that we are in an emergency such that we have never seen in California. This is something that requires a lot of attention and requires us to respond in a way to keep people safe. Nobody disputes that here today. Nobody disputes that there are actions that need to be taken in an emergency to help preserve and protect the people of this state.

As to the policies that have been enacted by this -- by this order, or by the other executive orders that we've talked about, we're not here to discuss the merits of those policies. Actually we might even agree with a lot of the policies that were put in place. But process matters in a republic, in a free society where we are governed by the rule of law. It's not something that we can just kind of sweep to the side and say -and that's what Defendant wants to do essentially, and say it really doesn't matter that we didn't follow the process because, and there are several different arguments that come after that. It really doesn't matter that we did, in fact, violate the separation of powers, but it's okay, and it really doesn't matter because, after all, the election is already happening right now. And so the election is going to come and go, and it really doesn't matter that we overstepped our -the clear bounds of our authority.

Well, it does matter. And $I$ think it matters even more so in an emergency. We don't cease to become a constitutional republic, to become a free society when we face an emergency, and this country and our state have certainly faced many great challenges in our history. And some of the most egregious human rights abuses happened when we deviated -- when we
deviated from our system of government, when we didn't recognize individual liberties, when we didn't recognize the need to separate powers and not allow for a centralization of powers.

I will note that it was an executive order that created Japanese internment here in California. Now, am $I$ putting this on the same level of that? No. But $I^{\prime} m$ saying how easily we can devolve into that system when we start to ignore the procedures, the process, that is in place. That's not just something that we can sweep aside. It is important, and we need to enforce it. And it is incumbent upon the judicial branch to enforce that in this case.

It is very clear from the evidence in this case that the Governor did assert legislative authority. He did legislate where he had no power to do so. We've gone through the statutory language of the Emergency Services Act painstakingly and pointed out that nowhere in there does it give him this power to unilaterally change statute. And we've also pointed out that his powers to issue orders and regulations, keyword, is limited to the provisions in the Act, in the chapter, and they -- and they have to be connected to that in some way. And, in fact, words and regulations are not legislative power. They are executive power. They are
the power to administer.
And so that is why this case is so
important. Yes, this election is going to come and go, but do we allow the Governor to continue to act in this way as he continues to assert that he has the power to do without any check on his powers? That's what Defendant would like you to do today is sort of ignore this -- this violation and to just kind of let things go as normal and then make it upon -- put the burden upon myself and my co-plaintiff or other similarly situated to continually bring cases -- case after case against each individual executive order that's passed to hopefully get into court fast enough before something else happens in an emergency, right, and -- or maybe the legislature acts or some intervening thing happens in the meantime to hopefully delay the check on his power. That seems to be the consistent strategy of Defendant in this case.

You should not allow that to occur. The judicial branch needs to be the one that provides that essential check to the Governor, and that is what we're asking you to do here today. We have clearly pled that we want the order to be struck down based on the clear legal interpretation. We do think this case can be decided as a matter of law.

But also -- but not just that alone. We do need an injunction, and we have prayed for that very clearly in our Complaint in paragraph 21 where we sought, we need to enjoin the Governor from further intrusions on legislative powers, specifically unilaterally changing statutes, amending statutes. But as we have also pointed out, that should include he needs to stay in the lines of the Emergency Services Act as we have proposed and the Court interpreted today, that, in fact, those orders and rules -- regulations as the statute provides must be related to provisions in the Act.

Now, Defendants say that we can't enjoin future acts, that those aren't ripe. Those orders aren't before us. That's not what we're asking the Court to do. As we know, we enjoin conduct, not acts, not future acts. We enjoin conduct, and we enjoin conduct so as to govern those future acts, to ensure that future acts will be in compliance with the ruling of the Courts. With the rule of law.

And so what we are asking is an injunction of conduct that heretofore the Governor will abide by the clear terms of the Emergency Services Act, which is he cannot suspend stat- -- or he cannot -- he can suspend statutes, but he cannot amend or alter statutes.

That is clear. And that his orders must be related to the provisions in the Act.

So I think we can -- you know, I'm more than happy to brief the Court further on why injunctive relief is certainly warranted and necessary here, but that is part of our request for relief, and $I$ think we need that, especially in these circumstances as I've outlined. We are in an important time in our history. And it cannot be the case that we sort of morph into a different form of government when we face a challenge. It has never been the case before. We shouldn't allow it to happen. When it has happened, it has had very grave implications for the citizens of our country, and we cannot allow to it happen here, and $I$ think it begins today that we provide that.

I didn't bring this case -- we thought a lot
about bringing this case because we knew the circumstances we were in. We even gave -- we, for long, gave the Governor the benefit of the doubt in the early stages of this emergency. But as we progressed along, we saw continued intrusions that violated that sacred compact that's outlined in our Constitution. And this order was the most clear case of a violation of that separation of powers. And that's why we brought the case ultimately to ensure that very -- in a very clear
way this Court and the judicial branch could provide those outlines and ensure that in the future we continue to be the free society, the republican form of government that provides the protections, the checks and balances that avoids the very tyranny that our founders were concerned about. It starts small, and that's why it needs to be checked early. And I ask the court to do that today.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Killeen?
MR. KILLEEN: Your Honor, we've extensively briefed everything in this case, and so $I$ will not dump on the court and the court staff all of those case citations again.

I think Mr. Kiley's ideas work well in theory, but they don't work in practice. They don't correspond to the facts of this case. California is grappling with a virus with no cure and that could be transmitted asymptomatically and no one had any idea what was going to happen. The legislature was working to safeguard the election. And they were working hard. They were working fast. And that meant they got something done in four months. That's good. That's fast.

Governor Newsom helped the legislature,
protected the election process by issuing this executive order. He had the authority to fill the gaps and critically, once the legislation was passed, he yielded to that legislation. There is no evidence that he has ever taken the position that his executive order superseded or was the law in place of the legislation. The legislation was the law when it was enacted. It's the law now. Your Honor, I just -- this is not a situation -- there might be situations out there where Governor Newsom could act like a tyrant in the eyes of Mr. Plaintiff -- of Mr. Kiley and Mr. Gallagher. If safeguarding elections at the request of folks in the legislature -- which is not in evidence -- that if safeguarding elections in the middle of, indeed, a once-in-our-history pandemic and then giving way to the legislation once it's been passed is against the law, so be it, but it's not.

And with that we rest, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else? Anything else?
MR. KILLEEN: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. GALLAGHER: Nothing further, Your Honor.
We did have kind of a written form of what
we believe an injunction could be in this case.
Obviously I know you have not yet ruled on that, but I
mean, if there is additional support you need -- that has been our request. So we just want to make that clear, and we have proposed, you know, versions of what that could be that we could submit to the court as well.

THE COURT: Okay. To that point, $I$ have the
orders that you provided, Mr. Killeen, regarding Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 17. And, truly, I haven't made a decision. I'm going to read my notes, look at the transcript, study the briefs again. It's all done, been beautifully prepared and a very nice job arguing your respective positions. And I expect that in short order -- very short order you'll have a tentative decision and then you'll have an opportunity to respond to that, and ultimately $I^{\prime} m$ guessing that you're going to ask the Court for a Statement of Decision. That would be my guess of how this would unfold.

Is that what you're expecting?
MR. GALLAGHER: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. KILLEEN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. So if you -- either of
you wanted to propose some kind of language that the other side had seen, $I$ would certainly look at that, but I'm not requiring it. But $I$ certainly -- this order is helpful for me today. I'll sign it, and if there is some language that you would like considered that you
shared with counsel in terms of the injunctive relief, I can -- I think that could be presented.

MR. GALLAGHER: So just so I understand, Your Honor, is your intent to -- we were going to request just a statement of Decision, but is it your intent that it would be a tentative decision that would be issued and then we would --

THE COURT: It would be the intended decision that you would receive and then you'd have an opportunity to respond and then ultimately I'd write the Statement of Decision, and one of us --

MR. GALLAGHER: Respond in terms of, like, would we write a written response to you?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GALLAGHER: Or arguing that in a subsequent - -

THE COURT: I don't think we'd necessarily be arguing it. When I've done them before, I've had - sometimes I've written them and I've heard nothing from one side and then a bunch of additions or objections from the other side, but ultimately have it become a Statement of Decision that would be available to everyone and probably the Court of Appeal.

MR. GALLAGHER: After hearing from both of us, then the -- after hearing from both of us. Or
giving us the opportunity for both of us to respond to the tentative, then you would issue the final Statement of Decision?

THE COURT: That's what $I$ am anticipating.
MR. GALLAGHER: I mean, we have some
language for the injunction portion that we can obviously share with counsel.

THE COURT: Have you shared that with counsel? And again, $I$ haven't made any decisions yet, but $I$-- it would be helpful to have some language that --

MR. KILLEEN: Your Honor, just one other housekeeping item.

If you are -- if after the statement of Decision you are intending to issue anything like this, the Governor would request either a two-week stay between the entry of the order and the entry of judgment or the two-week stay in the affect of the judgment once it's been issued to give us an opportunity to go up to the Court of Appeal. I think, as we said throughout the case, the order enjoining executive order $N-67-20$ is one thing. An order enjoining other conduct is a very different thing. So that -- we would request that, Your Honor.

MR. GALLAGHER: And obviously we would
object. You know, I think if you determine and the judgment is warranted in our favor, we think it should be effective immediately.

THE COURT: Okay. If you both want to brief that, you may. You're not required to. I'll consider both of your requests and decide accordingly.

MR. KILLEEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. GALLAGHER: I mean, to that point, to the injunctive portion, we do have a pocket brief that we could submit if that -- if it helps you. I don't know if that's needed. We have obviously discussed it during the trial, but we do have some additional -- we have a pocket brief prepared on that if -- obviously we would share what we're sharing with counsel and you.

Do you desire further --

THE COURT: I have --

MR. GALLAGHER: -- briefing on that?
THE COURT: I've got lots of notes here.
I'll have the transcript. I'll take anything you want to give me.

MR. GALLAGHER: We'll just, I guess, submit that for our purposes of --

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?
MR. KILLEEN: No, Your Honor.
MR. KILEY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. GALLAGHER: Thank you, Your Honor. (Whereupon the proceedings concluded at

1:27 p.m.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SUTTER

DEPARTMENT 2
HON. SARAH H. HECKMAN, JUDGE

JAMES GALLAGEHR AND )
KEVIN KILEY,
Plaintiffs, ) SUPERIOR COURT

VS.
GAVIN NEWSOM, in his official REPORTER'S capacity of Governor of ) CERTIFICATE California,

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                Defendant. )
    ```
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                Defendant. )
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                    ) NO .
    CVCS20-0000912
)
$\qquad$

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
) SS .
COUNTY OF SUTTER

I, Tamara L. Houston, CSR 7244, Official Court Reporter of the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of Sutter, do hereby certify that the preceding pages, 1 through 20, comprise a full, true and correct transcript of the proceedings reported by me on October 21, 2020, in the above-entitled matter.

$$
\text { Dated this } 30 \text { th day of October, } 2020
$$

## Samanas. Ilantro

Tamara $\bar{L} \cdot$ Houston, $\bar{C} \bar{S} \bar{R}$ No. $\overline{7} \overline{2} \overline{4} \overline{4}$ Certified Court Reporter


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